DPRK Forum

North Korea appears to have agreed to destroy the cooling tower at Yongbyon within 24 hours of being removed from the U.S. list of states that sponsor terrorism Accoring to the Washington Post:

[...]

North Korean officials had privately indicated previously they would destroy the tower as part of the disablement of Yongbyon. During talks last week with a top U.S. State Department official, Sung Kim, North Korea reaffirmed it would act quickly after Pyongyang is removed from the terrorism list.

During the talks, North Korean officials also tentatively agreed to release to U.S. officials thousands of pages of documents, dating back to 1990, concerning the daily production records of the facility. The records are intended to help U.S. experts determine how much plutonium was produced at the facility and thus verify North Korean claims.

The destruction of the tower as stated in the article would be one hell of a show, but as Richardson pointed out in his post at DPRK Studies, there are some problems with the so-called deal struck:

That is very nice, but I am more concerned with what North Korea is still not offering up; 1) what’s actually called for in the deal - a full and complete nuclear declaration; 2) unfettered access (including material samples) to all known and suspected nuclear facilities; 3) information and materials to ascertain the true status of North Korea’s uranium program, including the equipment known to have been sent from Pakistan, and the fate of some thousands of aluminum tubes purchased by North Korea.

I have to agree there are serious problems and raises questions. All of those points made made by Richardson implies the devil is in the details and according to the article, and nobody outside the negotiating table knows the details because

The diplomats spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the discussions. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack declined to comment “on ongoing negotiations,” he said.

Another interesting detail:

[...] though experts say its destruction would be mostly symbolic.

[...] Several months ago, North Korean technicians broke through the concrete bottom of the tower, making it unusable, but hot water could still be dumped directly in a nearby river if North Korea were unconcerned about possible ecological damage. Other aspects of the disabling of the facility are more significant; U.S. officials say they think that North Korea would need to order months of repairs if it wanted to restart it.

Apparently, if North Korea really wanted to restart it, I guess they could use the river to send hot water out and maybe pump cold water back in much like the reported nuclear facility in Syria (the evidence seems pretty convincing to me, but it is under heavy scrutiny), but to get it back up and running (from what I understand) could take a while to do along with placing the other items set aside wrapped in plastic and the like. I am not a nuclear plant expert, but from the pictures I posted quite a while back, it seems it is well taken apart (although not destroyed). Now, this is just Yongbyon. This is old technology, is in very bad repair, and this to me seems like a smokescreen. As Richardson implied, what about everything else?

Again, this is going to be based on a “trust me” basis to believe Kim Jong Il will be a good boy and cooperate. So far, he has not held his end of the deals and continually drags his feet while the rest of the crew at the negotiating table look like the fool. In my opinion, North Korea is very good at grabbing the carrot and running back in the cave. This part of the article bothers me:

Under a tentative deal struck between Washington and Pyongyang, North Korea will be removed from the terrorism list and from a second sanction — the Trading With the Enemy Act — once it produces a declaration of its nuclear activities. U.S. officials have especially been focused on the plutonium segment of the declaration, telling Pyongyang that it need only “acknowledge” U.S. evidence and concerns about two other issues: its nuclear dealings with Syria and a suspected uranium-enrichment program.

Then what? North Korea could concede and say “Yeah, we got all of the things you describe” but will all the materials remain there? This seems to imply if North Korea does acknowledge the things Washington (and others) want will have to trust Kim not to use them again. I simply do not understand the thought process here. Also as Richardson said in his points, nobody will need to go out there and physically verify everything that is suspected to be another program? Also, the deal obviously does not include biological or chemical weapons described by a Camp 22 guard who defected and described these items getting tested on prisoners. It all seems like a farce to me. Also, what worries me is once North Korea is removed from the sponsors of terror list and Trading With the Enemy Act, does that mean North Korea is free to trade without oversight? Something is really wrong here.

As said before, the Syrian connection is under heavy questioning:

US intelligence officials also accuse North Korea of giving clandestine help to Syria for the construction of a supposed nuclear plant destroyed last September by an Israeli air strike.

But Mr Kelly questioned some of those claims. “There does seem to have been some degree of nuclear co-operation with the Syrians, which is going to raise a lot of questions,” he said.

“But the story they’re building a reactor like Yongbyon — nobody would want a reactor like Yongbyon. This is 1968 technology, not well put together.”

He added that without a reprocessing plant to enrich nuclear fuel, it was unlikely Syria could develop an atomic weapon.

So what is the real story in Syria if it was not used for research or other peaceful means? If it is thrown out there for the sake of blocking taking North Korea off these lists, what else is going on? Again, something is not right.

Also see One Free Korea.