Dr. Andrei Lankov
Yes kids, it is must read material time again, and NKEconWatch delivers. Andrei Lankov wrote a piece in Asian Times about the current happenings in North Korea. Now as all North Korea watchers I know, know, Lankov is one of the few North Korea watchers who can be called the closest to an expert one can get. This goes along with the series I have been writing about, but if Lankov says something about it, chances are, that is more plausible and coherent than I could ever hope to do. So what did he have to say? In a nutshell, something is happening in North Korea, and it may seriously backfire.
As have been writing in part 4 (not finished yet) of the post divided Korea series, bottom-up discontent has been on the increase in the news as damaged as it may be, because of the lack of independent verification. However, as Lankov pointed out (and I did not know, but now know):
Meanwhile, the North Korean government also did something it has never done before: it said “sorry” to the people. In January, Nodong Sinmun, a government mouthpiece, reported that Dear Leader Kim Jong-il felt bad for being unable to provide his subjects with the level of material affluence they were once promised.
Emphasis mine. So it appears the government has never said sorry to the people before. I was looking for instances when writing the series, and now I know why I could not find it. It does not exist, and it makes perfect sense as to why - Great insecurity, preoccupation with one’s own brilliance or appearance. Because of the need to be perfect, it is difficult to impart new information to him, and he reacts negatively to criticism. I am very sure Kim Jong Il is very aware of the problems, as he knew when he made his statement at Kim Il Sung University. Problem with these instances are, as covered in Policy Elites, is information is most likely censored because officials are afraid to tell him what is really going on. Hence, the thing that could lead to his downfall - A tendency to surround himself with sycophants who tell him what he wants to hear, rather than what he needs to hear, making him out of touch with political reality. However, he is likely to know the problems, but is still out of touch with political reality because Lankov writes:
One can easily imagine how the Dear Leader (perhaps even driven by genuine sympathy to his long-suffering people) would look through a currency reform plan and say: “And what about poor wage-earners? Should we not reward the people who remained loyal to the socialist industry and did not go for black markets? Why not increase their salaries, so they will become affluent, more affluent than those anti-socialist profiteers of the black market?” Few, if any, officials would dare to explain the dire economic consequences of such generosity.
Emphasis mine. So, the reforms were enacted on Kim’s orders (it had to be Kim, with the other officials nodding “yes, yes” jotting every “precious” word), it backfired, and Pak Nam Gi was sacked and sent to Pete knows where. Which goes along with – Scapegoating when plans don’t work out. Since narcissists must be seen as perfect, when one of Kim’s plans misfires, the problem is not in the concept but the execution. Thus, Kim is ready to scapegoat when his plans don’t work out. The issue seems to be, according to Lankov, these games are starting to fall apart. Especially with the bone-headed currency devaluation scheme, which could of been because of, as Lankov said:
One can easily imagine how the Dear Leader (perhaps even driven by genuine sympathy to his long-suffering people) would look through a currency reform plan and say: “And what about poor wage-earners? Should we not reward the people who remained loyal to the socialist industry and did not go for black markets? Why not increase their salaries, so they will become affluent, more affluent than those anti-socialist profiteers of the black market?” [...]
Emphasis mine. It does not seem to “fit” in the profile Post suggested, because Kim only cares about Kim. So standing in his own shoes, I could imagine Kim Jong Il showing a facade of sympathy, but perhaps is stressing out wondering why things are not going as planned. Or worse, if he fears losing absolute control, love for/to himself, or if he fears somebody is plotting something against him personally. I seriously doubt it is out of genuine concern for his underlings toiling away in the salt mines, but “what is in it for me”. Lankov makes this point as well:
Their country’s economy is in a sorry state, to be sure, but survival of the population has never been a major item on their agenda. They just want to stay in control and not be overthrown by popular insurrection or by a coup – they are very good at this game.
So I am probably re-hashing the same thing, making an otherwise well-thought out analysis a mess (I apologize, Mr. Lankov). The main crux of the Kim Jong Il regime problem, as of late, according to Lankov is possibly two-fold. Internally, the attempt at bringing the old system back on track was a spectacular failure, and the regime is perhaps scrambling to find a solution not only to the economic problems on top, but the bottom-up marketization. The other is the international community’s collective yawn, making Kim stamp his feet in the hopes of negotiations and concessions. As Lankov writes:
In the realm of diplomacy, North Korea is not faring much better. For decades, Pyongyang has demonstrated uncanny skills in manipulating its neighbors fom whom it squeezed unconditional aid and unilateral concessions. The usual tactics consisted of three stages. In the first stage, the North Koreans raise tensions. Secondly, they launch missiles, test nuclear devices and make threatening statements. Finally, once tensions are sufficiently high for the world to feel uneasy, there are negotiations in which Pyongyang extracts aid that is essentially a reward for calming a crisis the North itself manufactured.
This time, both stage one and stage two were seriously mishandled. First, the North Koreans used both their trump blackmail cards – a nuclear test and a missile launch – almost simultaneously (analysts expected space of at least a few months before these two events). They also showered Washington with especially bellicose rhetoric, even though the Barack Obama administration was initially relatively soft on the North Korean issue.
As a result, the excessive activity of the North Koreans backfired: the US foreign policy establishment finally realized that North Korea would not surrender its nuclear program under whatever circumstances. This reassessment of the situation (or belated realization) meant that the US was now far less willing to shower Pyongyang with concessions. In the past, gifts were presented as incentives to surrender nuclear weapons, and since such surrender is now seen as unlikely, such generosity is not necessary. (See US finally wise to Pyongyang’s ways, Asia Times Online, November 12, 2009)
The North Koreans are now beginning to realize that the old trick is not working. They have only themselves to blame. Had they been slightly more careful last year, a significant part of the US establishment would still nurture the illusionary dream of “denuclearization through negotiations”.
The third stage of asking for aid was also handled badly. The unnecessarily aggressive rhetoric of the past was replaced by unusual softness in a short time – previously, the switch took months. Since August, North Korea has essentially begged to restart negotiations with the US and, especially, South Korea.
Pyongyang is demanding to restart cooperation projects. It is quite remarkable, since two of the three major projects – tours of Keumgang Mountain and Kaesong city tours – were abruptly stopped by North Korean authorities a year ago. Needless to say, the South Korean government is not too eager to restart negotiations. After all, so-called intra-Korean cooperation is essentially unilateral South Korean aid in disguise and Seoul sees no reason why it should hurry with the resumption of money transfers to Pyongyang. North Korean softness is (wrongly) seen by Seoul hardliners as a victory of the hard line they are advocating, so they say that an even harder approach will probably bring greater success.
Which may boil down to – Overoptimism about his own chances, and a tendency to devalue the adversary[,] and [s]aying or promising whatever is useful at the moment, with words that are strictly instrumental, to accomplish what is necessary; apparently sincere agreements are easily changed or disregarded. [...].
Something is happening in North Korea, and it does not look good. Yes, maybe things will carry on as they always had, but the bottom line is, Kim Jong Il will die one way or another, and do strongly agree:
[...]We are heading towards serious changes, and unfortunately nobody seems prepared.
Tags: Andrei Lankov, must read, NKEconWatch, North Korea
