DPRK Forum

Another very good possibility in the North Korea saga is the eventual collapse of the regime instead of the continuation of the Kim dynasty. This possibility has been speculated for the last fifteen years or so, and with all the huge events that took place that could have very well have led to collapse, the regime survived. For over 65 years, North Korea has held firm control over everything, and appears to still be in control. However, in my mind, it is not a question of if the DPRK will collapse, it is a matter of when. Today, I explore the possible scenarios on how North Korea could dissolve and what the possible outcomes could be. There are many theories and very few options. However, in my opinion, the regime will fade regardless of when the region is ready, and like many other things in life, it comes when it is least expected and the least convenient. If Eastern Europe and Russia are any indicators of how North Korea will fall apart, then it could very well be unexpected yet expected fate. On the other hand, Korea is way different from the way other Communist regimes were (and are) run.

Please be aware this is an ongoing research project, and information contained in this post may have glaring factual or missing information that I may not be aware of. If anybody has any insight that will make me better understand it, please say so in the comments and I will love to take your views into consideration and learn something. That is the whole goal of this blog.

First, we will look into the article I found pretty interesting called “When North Korea Falls” found here. And this summarizes it pretty well:

Yet for all Kim’s canniness, there is evidence that he may be losing his edge. And that may be reason to worry: totalitarian regimes close to demise are apt to get panicky and do rash things. The weaker North Korea gets, the more dangerous it becomes. The question that should be of greatest concern to the U.S. military in the Pacific—and the question that will likely determine the global balance of power in Asia for generations—is, What happens when North Korea collapses?

Good question, but the answers are the things that are questioned and debated. The article outlines the stages of a regime collapse:

Phase One: resource depletion;

Phase Two: the failure to maintain infrastructure around the country because of resource depletion;

Phase Three: the rise of independent fiefs informally controlled by local party apparatchiks or warlords, along with widespread corruption to circumvent a failing central government;

Phase Four: the attempted suppression of these fiefs by the KFR once it feels that they have become powerful enough;

Phase Five: active resistance against the central government;

Phase Six: the fracture of the regime; and

Phase Seven: the formation of new national leadership.

As the same article stated, North Korea was in stage four with the great famine of the 1990’s, and when the situation stabilized somewhat, it went back to stage three. In my estimation, North Korea economically already collapsed, and the article does agree with with that:

but was saved by subsidies from China and South Korea, as well as by famine aid from the United States.

While it does not say it agrees whether or not the aid being sent to the North is desirable, it just points out my argument that the seemingly endless aid does keep the Kims afloat. If the aid were to stop completely (in my view), the government would have gone away a while ago. That is why the theory of DPRK disengagement makes a lot of sense to me. To Kim Jong Il, as long as he keeps the game of cat and mouse going, the longer he can stay in power. In my opinion, it is not the threat of US invasion that makes him nervous, it is the treat to his grip on power that makes him nervous. The current situation is not looking very good, and another thing holding it together is his Songun policy. Keep the people afraid even if they do not buy the official line. While some do wholeheartedly with te official line, I do feel the people are starting to see more than the regime wants them to see. As stated in the last article in this series, the flow of information could very well threaten Kim and keeping his government together. As I said before, a lie can only sustain itself for so long. I basically reiterated this paragraph, but this paragraph does add one twist, the lesson of the fall of former Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceau?escu:

Kim Jong Il learned a powerful lesson by watching the fall of the Ceausescu Family Regime, in Romania: Take utter and complete control of the military. And so he has. The KFR now rules through the army.

As with a lot of communist regimes, the secret police, army and overwhelming conformity controls kept the grip on power. Once the loyalty of the armies were gone, the people rose up and protested, that’s when the cracks in those regimes started to crumble as in Poland, Romania and Russia for example (See Communism: The Promise and The Reality video 6). Speaking of Nicolae Ceau?escu, there is an interesting story about the man. His family had a similar cult of personality and on his visit to North Korea (and other places) he tried the system of Juche. This PDF is a very, very interesting read. Also, this site gives some good information on Nicolae Ceau?escu (Also, see this). As of right now, it seems the KPA is still well on message according to the article, that I cannot be too sure of, but from what I see from videos, pictures and the like, the KPA seems to be in line wit Kim Jong Il. If there is any factions within the KPA is unclear but unlikely:

There have been only individual defections of North Korean soldiers to the South. Even small, unit-level defections—which would indicate that soldiers are talking to one another and are no longer afraid of exposure by comrades—have not yet occurred. One defector from the North’s special-operations forces told me that soldiers in the ranks are afraid to discuss politics with one another.

If KPA units start deserting Kim, that could spell disaster, and with the extreme food shortages ad evidence of widespread corruption, it could mean Kim’s army could fracture but not necessarily an entire breakdown right away. Although there is no direct evidence to support this, the aid, the reselling of it on the black market, the illicit trade and selling off of infrastructure could mean Kim is in desperation to keep all the balls juggling in the air. I really believe the country is in crisis, and as said before, the only thing holding it together is the aid, and because the region does not want a government collapse, the aid is sent regardless. Right now, Kim is concentrating on keeping the Policy Elites happy:

The defector I spoke to—a scout swimmer—told me that while the special-operations forces live well, the extreme poverty of conventional soldiers would make their loyalty to Kim Jong Il in a difficult war questionable. Would they fight to defend the KFR if there were an unforeseen rebellion? The Romanian example suggests that it depends on the circumstances: when workers revolted in 1987 in Brasov, the Romanian military crushed them; when ethnic Hungarians did so two years later in Timisoara, the military deserted the regime.

So the above blurb does suggest loyalty to Kim is paramount to keep a potential for uprising at bay. North Koreans have tried rebelling and led to mass murder in the labor camps. One Free Korea tells of this tale (A must read by the way):

There’s really no telling why North Korea houses its prisoners this way, but it makes sense from the perspective of cold logic. As even the Nazis learned, camps are more secure if they’re less concentrated. Two dozen prisoners in a small village present much less of a threat of rebellion than, say, the large group of prisoners who rose up in the Onsong Camp in 1997. The uprising ended with 5,000 dead, and Kim Jong Il reportedly ordered every trace of the place scraped off the face of the earth. It’s easier to guess why prisoners are housed in huts; the camps’ main method of control is to keep inmates on the verge of starvation and extend them small rewards for informing on each other. That, and the hut-style housing, limit the opportunities to think unauthorized thoughts.

Now if the government were to dissolve, the far reaching variables are difficult to comprehend, but one could try to sit there and try to imagine it. The article does go on to discuss the possibility of the consequences of a collapse of the government to keep order and control, and this includes the control of the KPA and the masses.

Not to mention the region and abroad. What will the International community do in a former North Korea? That is a very, very difficult question to answer, no doubt about it (The article goes into the war in Iraq, but in this posting, I am going to steer clear from that debate).

Collapse and refugees

One of the obvious problems of a former DPRK is the very high possibility of mass defections to other neighbors such as China, Russia and South Korea. With starving and oppressed masses (and those trying to find loved ones from the division if there are any left alive), the very scale of trying to tend to them would be on a scale unimaginable.

In fact, what terrifies South Koreans more than North Korean missiles is North Korean refugees pouring south. The Chinese, for their part, have nightmare visions of millions of North Korean refugees heading north over the Yalu River into Manchuria.

That is why the debate of trying to get the North to reunify peacefully with special zones and cooperation are desirable to supporters but fruitless according to critics. The reduction of vast economic inequality seems to be on the forefront of the agenda, and the hope is that reunification can take place gradually and without problems. That is a nice thought, but in my opinion, that seems a tad Utopian. OK, then what could be the plan? I am guessing there is no set plan, but if there is one, I am not aware of it. In any case, damage control is going to be part of the process, and that is not going to be pretty. That is why if slow and peaceful reunification can take place, then I would be very, very surprised. However, all I see is a hard landing, not a soft one. Why? There is really no way to know for absolute certainty when the government should fall apart. Certainly, there could be signs, and there have been signs before, but it seemed to be false alarms. In my estimation, once the fractures are plain, it will be too late.

So who foots the bill? Whoever gets the refugees. I am guessing a lot of North Koreans are not going to want to stick around the former state that kept them away from the outside world for so long, and those that do want to stay are most likely the ones that are former loyals to the regime and have self interest to keep it going. In any case, somebody is going to have to get people that have been brainwashed for decades back to reality somehow, find them jobs, medical care, food, housing, and all the other goodies. That is all fair and good, but that is going to take decades to level off and will most likely cost billions and billions of dollars. I do not know if the International community is prepared for such a scenario, but if anything, I am sure the United States is going to play a major role in the humanitarian rescue (not just money but getting other countries to help out).

That is why South Korea plans to keep the North closed until the economic situation is somewhat on the same level, but personally, I cannot see how that is going to work (Somebody help me understand please). See, once the North has no government, it will most likely be in chaos. The article gives some clue to a possible solution:

Of course, South Korea would bear the brunt of the economic and social disruption in returning the peninsula to normalcy. No official will say this out loud, but South Korea—along with every other country in the region—has little interest in reunification, unless it were to happen gradually over years or decades. The best outcome would be a South Korean protectorate in much of the North, officially under an international trusteeship, that would keep the two Koreas functionally separate for a significant period of time. This would allow each country time to prepare for a unified Korean state, without the attendant chaos.

Following the Communist regime’s collapse, the early stabilization of the North could fall unofficially to the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and U.S. Forces Korea (which is a semiautonomous subcommand of PACOM), also wearing blue UN helmets. But while the U.S. military would have operational responsibility, it would not have sole control. It would have to lead an unwieldy regional coalition that would need to deploy rapidly in order to stabilize the North and deliver humanitarian assistance. A successful relief operation in North Korea in the weeks following the regime’s collapse could mean the difference between anarchy and prosperity on the peninsula for years to come.

My question remains. How will UN forces keep the people at bay and the chaos under control? That is a very tall and expensive order. I mean there is only so much money and assistance to go around, and the International community cannot provide all the monies needed to get the North in line with the South. As it says, it will take a really, really long time. That much I do agree with, but the critical time is going to be in the beginning. After a while, people are going to get tired of seeing billions and billions of dollars get poured into the country not to mention the manpower to sustain the long process. I can guess with South Korea as a friend of the United States is going to ask for help for the long haul. That is all fair and good, but to what extent can the South absorb the North, handle refugees and other things in such a short critical time? That I do not have the answer to. I guess that is why they do not want that kind of problem and is going to try for a soft landing. Not only will there be a massive humanitarian campaign, there is the question of the compounding problems of the former KPA, policy elites, former regime sympathizers, and floating weapons.

Former KPA, policy elites, sympathizers and free floating WMD

The article brings up a very scary possibility: free floating WMD. In the hands of former KPA, people with self interest to sell them, and worst of all, the potential of use of those weapons. Defectors talked about chemical and biological testing on humans in the gulags, and if the stories are true, then that is a very, very scary thing to even comprehend. Yes, forces in the former DPRK can try to secure the caches, but since the state was run so secretively, how would they know where to look to secure them? I hope there is some really good intelligence and they do know where to look, and the people do not have enough knowledge on where they are stored. These things I do not know, but time will most likely be critical, and my guess is unless they are secured before they get them, it will mean a very, very serious matter. I am obviously not an expert in military affairs, so those that do know can perhaps point me in the right direction on how this could happen. I do not have any idea whatsoever, but that is a scary thought.

But the Korean peninsula presents a far vaster and more difficult challenge. “The situation in the North could become so messy and ambiguous,” Maxwell says, “that the collapse of the chain of command of the KFR could be more dangerous than the preservation of it, particularly when one considers control over WMD.”

There is the understatement of the century. And then, it goes on to this:

… because of the free-floating WMD—a successful relief operation would require making contacts with KFR generals and various factions of the former North Korean military, who would be vying for control in different regions. If the generals were not absorbed into the operational command structure of the occupying force, Maxwell says, they might form the basis of an insurgency. The Chinese, who have connections inside the North Korean military, would be best positioned to make these contacts—but the role of U.S. Army Special Forces in this effort might be substantial. Green Berets and the CIA would be among the first in, much like in Afghanistan in 2001.

How successful that will be is another thing altogether, and I do not have the foresight, skill or experience to know how that works or will work. Again, enlightenment on this part would be good. What I am getting from this paragraph is getting the KFR to cooperate? Is that even possible?

the article does not get into this, but what about the former policy elites and other folks who are loyal to the regime? Are they going to be part of a possible insurgency? Furthermore, what about those that may not care about the regime and are only interested in making a buck? Can stuff be sold to others such as terrorists? Lastly, the part in the quoted paragraph gets me wondering. Will former KPA and or citizens try to gain control and form government(s)? I do not follow that very well.

Japan’s odd position

I am not all too familiar with the possible roles Japan would play in these scenes, but this article suggests Japan, although a key player in the saga, will have an odd position. I say this because from the best of my understanding, Japan is not liked very much by Korea. They did occupy the peninsula for many decades and Korea does charge them with a lot of brutal stuff. There are some problems I can see happening such as the role of the middleman the United States will play. The US is a close ally to South Korea and Japan, and my question is, will the United States ave to pick who they like best? That I cannot be too sure of.

Obviously, the United States could not unilaterally insert troops into a dissolved North Korea. It would likely be a four-power intervention force—the United States, China, South Korea, and Russia—officially sanctioned by the United Nations. Japan would be kept out (though all parties would gladly accept Japanese money for the endeavor).

Is Japan staying out of the matter because of the touchy political situation, by default, or because they will be arm’s length in the whole thing?

Between 1910 and 1945, Japan brutally occupied not only Korea but parts of China too, and it defeated Russia on land and at sea in the early twentieth century. Tokyo may have more reason than any other government for wanting to put boots on the ground in a collapsed North Korea, but it won’t be able to, because both China and South Korea would fight tooth and nail to prevent it from doing so.

That explains it somewhat, but the accepting of money is not too clear if they are hated so much.

China to swallow the North?

China harbors thousands of North Korean defectors that it would send back after a collapse, in order to build a favorable political base for China’s gradual economic takeover of the Tumen River region—the northeast Asian river valley where China, Russia, and North Korea intersect, with good port facilities on the Pacific. De facto control of a future Tumen Prosperity Sphere would bolster China’s fiscal strength, helping it to do economic battle with the United States and Japan. If China’s troops could carve out a buffer zone in the part of North Korea near Manchuria—where China is now developing massive infrastructure projects, such as roads and ports—Beijing might then sanction the installation of an international coalition elsewhere in the North.

Here is another thing I do not quite grasp. If North Korea were to be Seoul’s responsibility, will keep the border closed with UN forces to stabilize the newly disbanded Kim regime, how could China swallow it? Would South Korea or the United States stand for it? is this what this paragraph mean? I am getting the message China is going to take over or have deep interest in the former North. I am not seeing how it could work both ways.

Kim’s last stand

This article gives another grim possibility. An attack on South Korea. It states:

This is probably less likely to happen now than it was, say, two decades ago, when Kim Il Sung commanded a stronger state and the South Korean armed forces were less mature. But Colonel Maxwell and others are preparing for this possibility.

I do not want to contemplate a resuming of the Korean War, or in my opinion, Kim’s last stand in a last ditch attempt to keep power. Is he crazy enough to try it? The article does state a conventional infantry attack would not be likely but using the vast resources along the DMZ:

… So if the North were to attack, it would likely resort instead to a low-grade demonstration of “shock and awe,” using its 13,000 artillery pieces and multiple-rocket launchers to fire more than 300,000 shells per hour on the South Korean capital, where close to half the nation’s 49 million people live. …

But it goes to say:

But this strategy would fail. … The KFR knows this; thus any such invasion would have to be the act of a regime in the latter phases of disintegration. North Korea’s lone hope would be that the hourly carnage it could produce—in the time between the first artillery barrage on Seoul and the beginning of a robust military response by South Korea and the United States—would lead the South Korean left, abetted by the United Nations and elements of the global media, to cry out for diplomacy and a negotiated settlement as an alternative to violence.

If the North attacked the South, would it be too late to talk sense into Kim? He would be a very, very desperate man, and would he even contemplate such a move? As the beginning of the section suggests, it may be less likely with a weaker position than 20 years ago. Let’s hope Kim understands that, but as with all things Kim Jong Il, he is unpredictable, and anything is likely.

And there is no question: the violence would be horrific. Iraq and Afghanistan would look clean by comparison. … As part of a deal to halt the bloodbath, members of the KFR might be able to negotiate their own post-regime survival.

Again, if that were to happen, would it be too late? Again, a question I cannot even begin to answer.

Is China Kim’s last hope for survival?

… Another problem is that we can’t do much to squeeze the North Koreans economically; it’s China, not the United States, that is really keeping the regime alive. The Chinese are already in the process of gaining operational control over anything in North Korea that has strategic economic and military value: mines, railways, and so on. Thus, any soft landing for the KFR would more likely be orchestrated by Beijing than by Washington, even though the Chinese might not mind saddling the Americans with the short-term military responsibility of stabilizing a collapsed North Korea.

I do see how China is helping Kim keep afloat and does not want a reunified Korea because of the so called “buffer”. And in a post Kim world, it is China that has the last say if Kim remains in power? I am not all too familiar with the six-party talks, but from what I understood from it is China is the last arm’s length partner of North Korea. So does that mean China could halt the collapse of the government?

Which is why some of the military and civilian experts I spoke with argue for economic warfare against the North. Stop helping the regime with humanitarian aid, they say. The North Korean population has been on the brink of starvation for decades. The forests are denuded. People are eating tree bark. Stop prolonging the agony. Help the KFR collapse.

Of course, one problem with this strategy is that it could end up making North Korea’s direst military options more likely; as noted, regimes like this one, in the latter stages of collapse, are apt to behave irresponsibly, possibly resorting to WMD.

This snippet talks about the possibility if the United States happens to strike. I do not see Bush doing that now because of the new developments in the talks, the summit and other things, but as stated before, things can happen in a heartbeat, and North Korea resorting to WMD would not be out of the question in a last ditch attempt at survival. But on the other hand, if China is helping the Kims stay afloat and there is not much the USA can do economically as far as economic pressure goes, again, is it China that has the last say?

The possibilities are simply mind boggling, and the more I write this, the more my head hurts. There are very few options in the region, and almost all of them seem painful. The only non-painful solution is the soft landing and the reasoning with the mad dictator, but this is a man with one goal in mind and that is remaining in power.

North Korea is gone and the peninsula is reunited. Now what?

The long-term success of America’s basic policy on the peninsula hinges on the willingness of South Koreans to make a significant sacrifice, at some point, for the sake of freedom in the North. But sacrifice is not a word that voters in free and prosperous societies tend to like. If voters in Western-style democracies are good at anything, it’s rationalizing their own selfishness—and it may turn out that the authoritarian Chinese understand the voters of South Korea’s free and democratic society better than we do. If that’s the case, there may never actually be a Greater Korea in the way that we imagine it. Rather, the North’s demise will be carefully managed by Beijing in such a way that the country will go from being a rogue nation to a de facto satellite of the Middle Kingdom—but one with sufficient contact with the South that the Korean yearning for a measure of reunification will be satisfied.

Keep in mind that Asia—largely because it is so economically dynamic—is politically and militarily volatile. Its alliance structures are not nearly as developed as those in Europe, which has NATO and the European Union. Conflicting nationalisms are expressed in Asia through more than just soccer games. Thus, the question of whether it’s to be the American or the Chinese vision of North Korea’s future that gets realized may hinge on political-military decisions made in the midst of an opaque and confusing crisis.

As stated earlier in this post, it is going to be painful to reunite. However, I still do not know what Korea is going to do when it comes to the dramatically changed political landscape in the region. Te process is going to be long, hard, expensive and I do not know especially if the war in Iraq (concluded or not: again, I am not going into that debate) if Americans will want another long reconstruction process. So does this mean China will play the role this time? I do know American interests run deep in the region, and decisions made by all parties will change significant parts of the outcome. Soft landing or hard landing.

Somehow, I simply cannot see a soft landing. That is a very, very scary thought.

Update: The next part in the Path to Succession series is taking a bit longer than expected, but here is an interesting take from One Free Korea which I will have to research more:

My “most likely scenario” is that it will start with a food riot in a northern or east coast city that gets out of hand, causing an overreaction by security forces, and then a backlash by other security forces that breaks into open factional urban combat. The first such popular uprising is likely to be crushed when army units are called in, but now that the word of such things can actually make its way through North Korean society, the ripples of dissent and disgruntlement could lead to further outbreaks of unrest in other cities, or even within the security forces. Or, as when Burma crushed a pro-democracy uprising in 1988, a surviving group of armed resisters could hold out for some time in a remote frontier area.

That is a very interesting indeed. I never took into account a food riot, but that is a very good possibility considering the lack of food distribution in the country. With Kim only distributing food to the military and policy elites, the people are bound to rise against it, and as stated above, it could fail. However, once the wheels of discontent are there, that is basically it. This happened in Eastern Europe (Romania is a good example) despite the hundreds that died in the uprising, people were not going to take the abuse anymore. I will have to look up the Burma fiasco and see what that was all about. Thanks for the thoughts Joshua.

The next installment should be today sometime.

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