DPRK Forum

Sorry for the delay in the posting. I’ll remember not to make fixed dates on postings.

In the last part of the series, I looked at the “When North Korea Falls” article. I read some reactions to the article I did not read before (See comments in the last article of the series), and gave some extra insight into this complex and highly speculative series. In this part of the series, we look further into what else could happen in a former North Korea and the challenges it could face in the country and in the region. Only this time, I would like to make this more on a further tangent into the speculative. I find this stuff very interesting, and will probably go elsewhere too as I research this thing.

But first, I will look into the argument made in the comments:

That’s the money shot. The problem is that a lot of people would die in a short time (months, a couple of years) and governments would feel responsible. As it stands, probably even more have been dying over a much longer period of time. Six in one, half dozen in the other.

That presents a very good argument, and as said in the last part of the series, reunification is going to be a painful process no matter how it is done, and the way things are handled now are too Utopian. As always with this, I present the following disclaimer:

Please be aware this is an ongoing research project, and information contained in this post may have glaring factual or missing information that I may not be aware of. If anybody has any insight that will make me better understand it, please say so in the comments and I will love to take your views into consideration and learn something. That is the whole goal of this blog.

Sustaining the suffering and a rogue regime will happen

A lot of people may disagree with my stance about the aid and engagement path with the DPRK. That is fine, however, I am very convinced this is not going to work and will only prolong the suffering and Kim Jong Il’s criminal regime. As Richardson stated in the comments, it got me thinking about it a while, and I cannot help but to think it is a question of “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation. No matter the process, people are going to die under the hands of Kim Jong Il.

Should the calvary be brought in to save the country from a mad dictator? My opinion is a resounding “no” because why send the calvary in if North Korea can fall apart all by itself? The thing the international community has to worry about is during and after a collapse of the government which is going to be very ugly as it is. Right now, the sending of unchecked aid is not working. If any of North Korea watchers know, the aid is being abused, and even aid workers admit there is no oversight on it and keep sending it anyway. The naysayers who may say not sending aid is going to harm the people and other governments are to blame because of the suffering, the argument is moot.

Why?

Sending the aid will be little help for a starving North Korea especially the non-elite. In theory, it is a very nice international gesture to send aid to help starving masses. The only problem is, sending of the aid is not checked as said before, the people who need it will most likely not get it. If you have seen the Children Of The Secret State, the aid is resold on the black market, given to policy elites and the military to sustain the Songun policy. The people still suffer and die. While it keeps the Kims afloat for a longer period of time, it only prolongs the agony. Kim Jong Il does not care about his people. He only cares about staying in power, and to stay in power requires hard cash and aid to keep the machine well oiled.

In an odd twist, there are reports of North Korea letting aid workers in the normally off limit areas. Where they are allowed to distribute the aid, how long they are allowed to distribute the aid, what extent the aid is being consumed for those who really need it and the overall transparency is another thing altogether. That I do not know, but knowing Kim, he may have the aid workers do all of this because of the serious crisis the latest floods had, and in my view, since it did directly affect the elite residing in Pyongyang, that makes Kim look bad to say the least. When will the workers be kicked out this time? I think once Kim gets what he wants and some semblance of stability is there. In other words, not stability of the peoples’ happiness, but the happiness of the policy elites.

Cut the funds, aid and other goodies altogether and let the regime take its final crap. Critics are not going to like this idea at all because no aid means no food for the people. That is true, and it is also inevitable the backlash from such a move will cause a huge outrage. I can see it now (I will not say from whom. Wink, wink, nudge, nudge…). It does not matter anyway, because even if the aid continues to be sent, the normal population is going to see very little if nothing anyway, so why bother? It may be more than people getting or not getting the food. It is a regional political issue once the aid is cut off, the acceleration due to gravity will be a quick certainty. Keeping the aid flowing means keeping the buffer and the status quo going.

In other words, look the other way, keep Kim from doing something stupid (like nuclear weapons), keep his failed economy going for a little while longer, and try to figure something out such as a quiet reunification. That is a reason why I do not hear anything about the human rights issues when the talks are on the table, because not only would it be denied by Kim, it will only piss Kim off. I seriously doubt Roh is going to bring the issue up during the summit. I can bet some money on that.

Alright, it seems to be a lose-lose situation. What is the least painful way? The least painful way I can see is the hope for peaceful reunification as this article points out:

Four possible scenarios for collapse are advanced; two soft landing and two hard landing. The soft landing scenarios result in gradual reunification in accordance with the Republic of Korea’s three phase reunification plan. The “hard landing” scenarios cause tremendous suffering, increased instability, and require intervention in order to stabilize the peninsula and prevent spill-over both to the north and south as well as massive migration of the north’s population.

And then it outlines the tasks needed to take place:

… following DPRK collapse: (1) establishment of security and stability; (2) humanitarian relief operations; (3) security of nuclear research, product ion, storage, and delivery facilities; (4) disarming, demobilizing, and resettling the DPRK military. In order to accomplish those tasks the UN Security Council should recognize its responsibilities for conducting post-conflict operations to restore order in the north, establish a mandate for such operations, and build a coalition among the Northeast Asian powers and the US to conduct combined operations under the command of the current UN Command.

This is much easier said than done. The order may not be in any particular order because one would imagine humanitarian and relief operations would be foremost and may last throughout the campaign which could last many years. Even with a soft landing, the people on the wayside will still need vast assistance once the regime is gone. What also tends to bother me is what would be found once the DPRK government collapses? I have a few guesses, and I am also certain readers do as well, but it has me thinking a lot.

What will be found once North Korea is not there anymore?

The second phase of the operations in the list above talks about the security of nuclear facilities, and I would also like to add the possible biological and chemical weapons as well. Again, this task is going to be much easier said than done because since North Korea had over half a century to stockpile weapons, no telling where they might be or are hidden. Now the extent of how many stockpiles may be in question because the numbers may be bigger than originally thought, there is simply no way to know until the powers that be go down there and look at it.

I share the worry with the author regarding these weapons floating around and being re-sold or used for insurgent warfare in case former loyalists get desperate:

Accomplishment of this task will reduce the likelihood of nuclear material or technology being transferred to other potentially hostile regimes or terrorist organizations. This single task is one in which all the regional powers have a common interest. All weapons related material will have to be secured and then disposed of in a verifiable manner. This will be a significant military operation and will require assistance from the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Additionally, all the major powers in the region will want to have representatives participate in order to ensure that no material remains unaccounted for.

Again, the author does not outline the details on how it will be done, or if it could be done, it is simply what needs to be done. Since I like to guess about stuff, I have to say this is going to be a very large, complex and difficult task. North Korea has a lot of places on the wayside, and stuff could be found for years. I guess the main thing is to find all the major storage and manufacturing sites and secure those. The question is, will they get them before they do? That is unknown, but if there is any insurgency, it could get pretty bad.

Dismantling of the DMZ? Some questions readers could help me answer

Another question that has me wondering is what about the DMZ? There is talk of keeping North Korea isolated until it can get in line economically with South Korea, but once the government is gone, what will happen?

Will the DMZ be kept in place to keep the North isolated until it is in line with the South?

The DMZ is the most heavily fortified border in the world with all kinds of nasty surprises along the divide. If the DMZ were to be dismantled, just how long would it take to clear the mines, tank traps, anti-aircraft sites, and the host of other things? If people were trying to cross the DMZ in desperation to find food and a better way of life, how many could be killed? Yes, I can picture a lot of people near the DMZ to try and cross the famous Panmunjom, but that is such a small part of the DMZ, and not everybody will flock down there to cross in case of a hard landing, but regardless, that crossing of the DMZ will be a very dangerous one even with no KPA around to stop them (although at the beginning can see bewildered and desperate KPA trying to stop people from escaping). Could South Korea keep some forces along the DMZ in an attempt to keep order, or will that be moot at that point? Also, Once stability is in place, how long will it take to dismantle the DMZ so it is only a relic of the former Korea cold war? I can guess it will take years and would be considered pretty dangerous for those years. Of course, people could not only cross the DMZ, but that was just one area I was wondering about specifically.

Could a desperate Kim Jong Il (or whoever is next in power) order mass murder?

Hitler knew when his time was running short, and near the end of his regime stepped up the final solution. Could the same happen in North Korea? There are many reported camps, and could the leader order the mass killings of prisoners to hide evidence, or will that be too big of a task in the process? The thought is very hard to grasp and is very gruesome to even consider, but could that be a possibility? I sure hope that does not happen, but that question has not been raised in the articles I have read in the collapse scenarios. Those camps are reported to be very fortified, and people trying to escape those prisons could escape alright, but how many could be killed in the process?

What could be found at the camps dotted along North Korea?

Next, what will be found in those camps? Hundreds of thousands of people are said to be there including families of the so-called accused. (One Free Korea has a good writeup of the Camps including videos - if you have not read about it, please go down there and read it now) Just how long will it take to clean that up? If it is anything like the concentration camps in Germany, I cannot even imagine the level of horrors that will be discovered once North Korea is gone. Would officials find torture chambers, biological weapons testing sites and the like? I can barely imagine the level of crimes that occur there. One thing is for sure though, if the leader and his cronies are caught, I could guarantee there will be some serious charges and tribunals going for those crimes alone. The list of those crimes will be long, and I hope for the world’s sake justice will be carried out for the many decades of killing, torture and testing with innocent people.

The humanitarian work will be very, very large indeed!

Next, there is the question of the sheer level of humanitarian crisis in North Korea. Once the blue helmets start the long process of humanitarian work, it is not just the prisoners who will need the assistance. There are millions of people living in the rural areas and outside the showcase cities that had little to no access to much needed food, medicine, shelter and other basic necessities of life. A lot of these folks would have never set eyes on an outsider, will be scared, hungry and bewildered. Even when food, medicine, clothes and other things are distributed (and with oversight!), there is the mental and spiritual breakdown. After all, these are people, and beyond the political complexity of the situation, should (and most likely will) be the a key factor in the stability process. I can also guess some will never get well emotionally, and the decades of indoctrination, denial, no access to outsiders and other such horrors will reverberate for many, many years to come.

… the current situation in North Korea is a major contributor to the present instability and will help in causing the ultimate collapse of the regime. If relief is not brought to the suffering population, the seeds of another war, or as a minimum, an insurgency will be sewn. Large scale relief operations must be conducted simultaneously with establishing security and stability because by taking away the root cause of the problems of the population, the potential for the outbreak of civil strife is reduced. Furthermore, by getting relief to the people where they live, the desire for migration either north to China and Russia or south to the ROK is lessened. Only by providing relief can a legitimate and effective “stay put” policy be implemented. In addition to military forces conducting humanitarian relief, it can be expected that a large number of non-governmental organizations and private volunteer organizations will contribute to this effort and they must be allowed to do so. T he military forces must take advantage of this aid and integrate them as best as possible into operations.

I was also wondering if the South had or has any plans for a sudden collapse, and there is some semblance of an answer here:

Obviously, the main actor in any collapse scenario is the ROK. It has the moral responsibility and the historical, cultural, and national ties to the north that require it to be the lead, if not sole, player in dealing with DPRK collapse. However, the ROK must consider the fiscal realities of bringing stability to the north and reunification by absorption as happened in Germany. Following German reunification, that country experienced significant economic and social upheaval with rising unemployment rates, initial declining economic growth, and increased taxes. It is estimated that it had to spend more than six percent of its GNP, approximately one quarter of its annual budget, on reunification.

The South’s plan for controlled reunification is known, and is on the forefront of the agenda, but what is not known are any plans of sudden reunification. Of course, the reunification during a hard landing will be much different from the German reunification with the economic and humanitarian costs will be much, much larger in my estimation:

These costs are probably the main reason behind the ROK’s three phase reunification plan; however, that plan is predicated on mutual agreement and gradual implementation between the ROK and DPRK and does not allow for the collapse of the north and the sub sequent immediate absorption by the south. What is the ROK plan in the event of collapse? During the course of this research no plan for such a contingency was discovered. It is likely that the ROK does have such a plan but will not publicize it for fe ar of alienating or provoking the north. In lieu of the actual plan the following is a recommended course of action for South Korea.

I have not seen anything either, so I am sure nobody really knows for sure what plans are in place in case of such an event. Of course, they want to avoid that, but in my opinion, it should be planned, and others should know about it. Yes, people will disagree with me on this part, but the reason I say this is, if people are aware of the very real possibility of the hard landing, the economic, social and other aspects should be discussed. Yes, they do not want to provoke the north, but I am sure deep down, the leaders in the north will see the writing on the wall of they do not see it already. I am just a little outsider and see the cracks forming slowly. It only a matter of time before the dam breaks.

Rebuilding of the antiquated infrastructure will be gigantic as well in any case hard or soft landing. Whole cities seem to be deserted, power generation is at a halt, crumbling buildings are everywhere, factories are shut down and parts stripped. The list is long, and it will cost untold billions of dollars and many decades to restore and geting it in line with the South. Even in the showcase capital, Pyongyang, I could see the very, very poor conditions of the buildings. I cannot imagine the infrastructure outside the city. Sure, there are special zones, Kaesong and other investments going on right now, but that does not even begin to start the reconstruction process. However, there are countries and entrepreneurs who would invest that money to exploit the rich resources the North has, no doubt in my mind whatsoever. But could it be a possibility there would be political wrangling on who gets dibs on the resources? I can only guess there will be deals struck publicly and privately to get the infrastructure in place as soon as possible. North Korea has a lot of stuff to bring to the markets, and will at least bring some money back into the economy that will be no doubt very strained in the event of a hard landing. The question is, just how it will be done, and how long it will take to get it stable. Not overnight, that’s for damn sure.

However, there are some significant advantages to the ROK. Most importantly, a UN led operation could provide a long term commitment of a recognized world-wide organization which could set the conditions for the ROK to implement its three phase reunifica tion plan. A UN force could be deployed to bring relief and stability to the population, establish a UN protectorate, while simultaneously embarking on infrastructure redevelopment through investment by the regional powers, and economic and political res tructuring which would facilitate a gradual and smooth transition to a reunified Korea. In addition, because there are likely to be problems caused by the deployment of military forces, the use of forces under a UN mandate rather than unilateral ROK oper ations will keep the blame for any negative activities away from the ROK, thus facilitating a smoother transition to reunification. On the other hand it is possible that the south’s credibility with the population of the north could be reduced because it allowed action by an outside organization.

When considering the interests of all the regional powers and the US, it appears that a UN led operation is the best course of action for dealing with a collapsed DPRK. Although it would not be each nation’s ideal choice, it does provide a consensus approach that will allow the attainment of most of the desired end states for all players. It would prevent dominance by a single nation since all the regional powers would have a chance to participate in some way or another, either through the direct employment of troops, as with possibly China, Russia, and the US or through fiscal resources from Japan. It would bring regional stability and allow infrastructure rebuilding in order to begin economic development. Finally, the cost for reunification would be spread among the contributing nations in return for future economic benefit.

Regardless of which approach is ultimately used, there are four mission essential tasks which deal specifically with operations upon the catastrophic collapse of the DPRK that must be accomplished in order for any of the regional powers to accomplish their objectives and protect their interests. These tasks must be executed near simultaneously and as soon as possible after the nature of the collapse is identified because they are mutually supporting and cannot be conducted unilaterally without regard to the others.

and cooperation with the other nations will help in that regard, but will not be easy at all. Not just economically, but politically. The landscape, as said before, will be very different (how it will be different is under heated debate, but we can all agree it will be very different). I suppose whatever comes of the situation, something will be worked out even if all countries do not get their way 100%.

The million man army in disarray may mean a recipe for madness

The above things said are after the possible hostilities are quieted down. In the beginning, it is going to be a very complicated, possibly bloody and very ugly process to get the KPA, policy elites and factions under control in the event of a hard landing. In that messy process, aid will have to be distributed, people cared for, cities secured, and the list goes on and on. There is a million+ man army in the KPA, are well indoctrinated and most likely will put up some kind of fight even if the leader is gone. North Korea should not have the expectation of people inviting any occupying forces with open arms. I do not think anybody thinks that either. The question is (and seems to be answered), how will the KPA get disarmed and disbanded?

Aside from the nuclear issue, the 1.2 million man military will be the most destabilizing factor in the north. This sensitive operation will require great skill in order to prevent further violence. It will have to be done through an effective information program (a leaflet program?) and negotiations by military and diplomatic leaders backed up by a credible capability to coerce should negotiations fail. As with security and stability, effective humanitarian relief operations will make this task easier by removing the need to have to fight for survival.

It should make things easier, but not a cakewalk by any means whatsoever. Nations have underestimated factions, armies and political structures before and paid the huge penalty for that underestimation. My guess to a solution is trying to prepare for that uncertainty and the possibility of long term insurgency. How that will be done is unknown to me (because I am no general), but it is painfully obvious disarming will not be easy:

Diplomatic efforts must be focused on building and sustaining a coalition under UN control. Immediately upon recognition of the collapse, the UN Security Council must establish a mandate which will authorize a coalition to conduct operations in the north . This should be based on the combined UNC, ROK, and US responsibility for conducting post-conflict operations stemming from the final termination of the Korean War. South Korea must request such assistance and be willing to reunify using a combination of its three phase reunification plan with the assistance of the UN. The coalition should consist of China, Russia, the US and the ROK as the main contributors. Although Japan will likely desire to participate, due to the historical enmity between the Koreans and Japanese, the commitment of Japanese defense forces will most likely be deemed unacceptable. Furthermore, China and Russia will be wary of having Japanese troops on the mainland; therefore, Japan should contribute to the coalition through financial aid to the UN and private economic investment in the region because Japanese business will be welcome but its military will not.

The coalition and the ROK must recognize the north’s internal political structure at the province and local level and must use it to make reunification work. Remnants of the old regime from the national level must be allowed to leave the country and have sanctuary in a third country to prevent destabilization and attempts to revert to its old system. Most important, this remaining senior leadership must be identified and given the opportunity to leave the country and have an opportunity to make a new life. The reason for this is to prevent a Maoist-type “long march” and a possible insurgency. Finally, diplomacy must focus on the using the region as a way to bring the regional powers into a long term cooperative arrangement emphasizing mutual economic prosperity and non-aggression. The coalition can in itself become the center of gravity for regional security and economic development.

Information programs must support building and sustaining the coalition. The theme should be that the UN and its UNC has a responsibility to conduct post-conflict operations resulting from the final termination of the Korean War and that only a coalition of the major regional powers can bring the war to a successful conclusion. Internally in the north an information program should be developed which exploits the “juche” philosophy as uniquely Korean as opposed to North Korean and that it can only be realized by a gradual transition to a reunified peninsula.

Whew, a very tall order indeed! Some questions remain in the above paragraphs. Addressing the first emphasis in the first paragraph, I can imagine there will be a lot of heated debate, controversy and outcry if any former senior members are sent away to asylum and not brought to justice. I say this because so many folks who tried to escape and sought asylum were sent away to labor camps, killed or tortured. I simply cannot see this flying at all. If the charges of genocide are indeed true, to just let them go could create a huge political problem. Sure, they do not want the old system to come back, but in my opinion, once the DPRK is gone, I can bet the old system will not return. So why would that be a good idea? Am I missing something here? The second part is also just as confusing. Once the regime is collapsed, will Juche be gone along with it? Yes, Juche has been around for many, many decades, but how will a propaganda campaign play a role in this process? I will bet un-indoctrination will be a very slow and painful process. The entire country has been bombarded with Juche propaganda for all those years, and people will not know anything else. Such a program will be very difficult.

The long, un-reeducation process will most likely not happen overnight

Another thing that I have not seen in any of the articles is the convincing of millions of North Koreans they have been duped all along. I have thought about this for months now, and still cannot really grasp the enormity of a un-reeducation process (is that even a word?) North Korea has one of the most pervasive cults of personality in the world, controlled media, and had a closed society for many years. The Kim regime depended on an oblivious population all at the same time pumping half-truths and hyperbole in every aspect of life. Yes, it is possible many folks may not buy the official line, and yes, many have stated they did not buy the official line, but there are many that still believe it (See Information Infiltration). If the information does bring the regime down, perhaps the process would be easier, but there are still people that would be very shaken by the loss of the ideology and exposure to the outside.

Getting people to understand what it is like on the outside will not be an easy task. Telling them the United States is not the devil (Well, a lot of people outside North Korea think the United States is the devil, but I will not get into that), South Korea is not a wasteland, and people have freedoms, lights, and food. I can only imagine how bewildered these folks would be, and my guess is there would be a huge split of emotions because of the long indoctrination process. At one part, they will be surprised it is not so bad, yet at the same time may mourn the loss of the leaders they were told from birth to love and obey.

Getting people in line with the world will be an unreal process as well. Some people have never seen somebody other than a fellow Korean and may be very, very frightened to see somebody else in their city or village. If they have been told since birth the Americans or other nations are there to cause them harm, and the leaders were there to protect them, that loss along with the evil blue helmets may present a challenge if not hostility and overwhelming fear. The process should be taken with care, the forces should be sympathetic, and try to convince the population they are there to help and not hurt them. This is not going to be an easy task, because of in the event of a hard landing, they will most likely see clashes with forces. So how would that be balanced? That question is unfathomable in my opinion.

What will happen once the forces do come marching in? There are monuments to the leaders everywhere, and will say for instance the taking down of the Kim Il Sung statue be an event unimaginable? North Koreans see these monuments as shrines, they talk to the portraits like they are real and have genuine love and fear for them. So my question is, should the process of un-indoctrination be handled with care, or will people be happy to see the symbols of tyranny be toppled down? I cannot really see that happening. Perhaps readers can give some insight into these possibilities.

I think this is enough for right now, and plan to do another part in this series. Feedback, criticisms and other discussion is welcome.

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