DPRK Forum

In the last part of this series, we looked into the basics of the Juche idea, how it started, how factions were rooted out, the rise of Kimilsugism and how it differed from the Stalin regime. Much of the content was not mine, but mostly questions and my own interpretations of what was already published on the Internet. As I said before, I am just learning this stuff, and I may have to go back and revise some things as I learn it.

Today, we look further into the Juche Idea and how it works for the policy elites, normal North Korean people and presentation both inside and outside the reclusive country. From what I have read so far, they all seem different. So we shall dig in the Policy Elites paper a little more too.

As always: Please be aware this is an ongoing research project, and information contained in this post may have glaring factual or missing information that I may not be aware of. If anybody has any insight that will make me better understand it, please say so in the comments and I will love to take your views into consideration and learn something. That is the whole goal of this blog.

Reading into Kim Il Sung’s doctrine

The above paper is a pretty good read, and tels in a very compact way how the Juche Idea changed over the years as times changed, the political landscape changed and the eventual “independence” from the ideologies that shaped North Korea. It does not take a rocket scientist on the inevitability of change, and those changes under the leadership of Kim Jong Il (The Songun policy is a good example) as well. Those changes are outlined in his own writings including On The Juche Idea. There are other writings, and those an be found on the Juche specific sites listed on the other posting for your convenience. Unfortunately, not all writings are available, and if they are around, I do not know where to find them. If anybody knows of a good English translation to these items, please let me know. I would be most appreciative.

As the Juche doctrine does change to fit the times and on the leader’s will, there are a few things that do not change, and because of the need for survival, the main goals of North Korea have to fit with those changing times, changing of the advisers, and the leadership. The paper does tell of one fundamental truth about Juche and the DPRK in general:

Nowadays in the North Korea `Juche-Sasang’(Juche Idea) passes for the best idea and at the same time the moral standard determining the guiding principles for the people in every field of a society and it also plays a role of religion distinguishing right and wrong.

I would not call it more than a religion. I would call it forced unconditional conformity with a heavy dose of cult of personality. The Kims infiltrate every aspect of life, and without the endless praises of the leaders, the people trying to fight for survival in a very closed society, they have nowhere else to turn but the leaders. That is why so many have been voting with their feet and as a result repressive strategies have been put in place to instill fear instead of voluntary conformity no matter what the official line says it is.

The bottom line is, Juche are the sacred writings of a leader that has been dead for a while, but is not considered dead, but rather living in the hearts of all North Koreans who are forced to wear the lapel and bow to the many thousands of monuments dotted all over the place. Kim Il Sung is god. Kim Jong Il is the son of god, and I believe he rode the coattails of his father to the throne. Instead of relying on charisma and brutality, Kim Jong Il relies on brutality and a change of the guard to fit his own way of running the business of totalitarianism.

The goals of the DPRK leadership:

Juche wants to be known to be self-reliant, glorious, successful and something others can emulate. Obviously, like all Utopian societies, they have unrealistic goals and is bound to fail. It is my belief Juche failed already, and as of now, it is in damage control mode before it simply dissolves in a violent death. That is another reason why the doctrine changes, reckless policies are put in place, reforms are tried, and people are forced into conformity. This never works, and this system is doomed to fail on all levels. History has shown this, and there is no reason to believe North Korea will be immune to such a similar fate. In the meantime, we just wait, Kim Jong Il buys his time, and tries all sorts of things to old his grip on power. So far, it has worked, and while analysts predicted the collapse of the regime on all levels, it seems to keep on keeping on (If you want to know more details, read the last posting of this series). Despite the changes in the doctrine, there seems to be several unwavering points that do not seem to change:

1. Power must be retained at all costs.

According to one official line, this seems to sum it up pretty well (unknown date of publication from the KCNA I’ll try to find it):

The WPK is leading the struggle of the army and the people of the DPRK to accomplish the Juche cause to a brilliant victory, enjoying high dignity and leadership authority, as it has achieved the unbreakable unity and cohesion around him and has been tested and experienced in the course of weathering out the tempest of the Songun revolution.

This is clearly a change to the Songun policy, and one of the bigger shifts of the Juche Idea (I had to wade trough a very terrible web page with no way to turn off the horrible music to find anything. If you want the very long winded version, check this page out). Furthermore, the over-deification of Kim Jong Il and the reasoning behind the Juche Idea, the shift in policy from the one of his father is apparent in both on the Global Security page and the Songun studies page:

Victory is always in store for us as long as there is the leadership of the great party having the distinguished leader at its top post. Kim Jong Il represents the destiny and future of the Korean people and a symbol of all forms of dignity and honor of the country.

The cult of personality is clear in this snippet, as it is in almost all the writings, banners, slogans and the like. It should be clear how the leaders are considered the only source of hope and as stated before, conformity is voluntary and without force. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are the sole providers of everything and is the prime example of the ultimate nanny state:

In view of the essential superiority and the characteristics of socialist society, it is important to pursue a correct, unbiased policy which emphasizes political and moral incentives to the working people and properly combines these with their material incentives in socialist construction, which actively puts into effect communist measures and adheres strictly to the socialist principle of distribution according to the quality and quantity of work done, and which correctly combines the voluntary enthusiasm of the working people with control by them.

…

We should enshrine the fixed faith that the country and the nation have a rosy future as he is leading the Party and the revolution. We should firmly believe and follow him only with undisputed trust in him despite whatever storms. We should eternally glorify his undying Songun revolutionary leadership feats as an eternal cornerstone of the WPK and the revolution and the greatest national treasure. We should protect him politically and ideologically at the risk of our lives, holding high the banner of devotedly defending the headquarters of the revolution.

Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung built these stories in the writings of the sacred Juche texts to only build themselves up and retain that power at all costs. All factions, opposition, slight mumble under the breath to even remotely question the “glorious” leadership of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il or Juche will lead to horrific consequences and does not matter one iota how far up or down the social ladder they happen to be.

That is the reason why important positions in the KWP, KPA and other very high level departments are usually occupied with people that may have little if any expertise in the department they chair. Rather, it is a showing of loyalty and how brown their nose is. That is one of the key things to survival in the very high levels of the hierarchy. The elite of the elite roles may be situated like so:

This is adopted from the Policy Elites paper (page I-2)

And Kim Jong Il drives the point home saying it in the nicest way possible:

It is necessary to consolidate as firm as a rock the single-minded unity of the Party, the army and the people as the community united by the same destiny whose members share idea, intention, destiny and future with the leader. Minju Joson says that there is an immensely bright prospect for the revolutionary cause of Juche as it is advancing under the leadership of the WPK having Kim Jong Il at its head.

There is not a lot said about the official writings on the inner workings of the party let alone how leadership is held at all costs under the banner of the Songun, but the Policy Elites paper gives some clues (There are a TON of them on different levels, but this should give you a taste):

First, an officer is indebted throughout his career to Kim Chong-il and to specific individuals for his promotions and quality of life. Second, an officer’s rank is dependent upon political loyalty and reliability rather than professional competence and experience. This allows Kim Chong-il to depend upon the absolute loyalty of the military. It also allows him, should he desire, to easily bypass the organizational chain of command and issue an order directly to a mid- or low-level officer.

By all accounts, Kim Chong-il is a workaholic, micromanager, and “information junkie.” He is technologically savvy, impatient, quick-tempered, intelligent, and ruthless. By his own admission, he surfs the Internet daily, regularly watches NHK (Japan), CCTV (China) and CNN, and has foreign books and articles (especially anything written about himself) translated and summarized for him. He prefers to manage almost everything directly, down to the most minor of details. Without his personal approval, nothing of significance can be initiated or accomplished.

…

… Given this vortex of institutionalized corruption, fear of displeasing Kim Chong-il, and a convoluted flow of information, it is certainly within the realm of possibility that Kim Chong-il is being deceived or mislead at some level by subordinates. Exactly how it occurs is unclear, but it may manifest itself in a manner similar to the Iraqi regime under Saddam Hussein. It may be something to the effect that managers or leaders of programs exaggerate achievements or the potential capabilities of programs or systems. …

This makes sense because the power holding elite to the leader are given perks all others under them do not have such as:

… It is manifested in the access elites have to information, foreign manufactured goods, opportunity to have their children travel abroad for schooling, their own greater opportunities to travel, nepotism, etc. Thus, favoritism and cronyism are endemic among the elite.

The favoritism with the policy elites are crucial to leadership survival under Juche, and even if it is not in the official line, the hierarchy may know the truth, and goodies from the Leader and other subordinates are evident from defector accounts. If the goodies are not given, and the elite do not get what they want to meet their own ends (not just ideology), the regime would not last very long at all. However, it does not mean all of them want the perks. Others have voiced concern (such as Hwang Jang Yop) and are sent packing if it is to run away on their own or to the gulags for further sanitation.

2. Keep the population oblivious to the outside world to maintain the leadership based on half truths or outright lies.

According to the Brooking’s Institution’s article Political Classification and Social Structure in North Korea gives a god overview on the Juche social structure and how it is not exactly how it appears:

Since the 1950s, the Kim regime has subjected its people to a series of political examinations in order to sort out those who are presumed to be loyal or disloyal to the regime. After a three-year period of examination that began in 1967, then-president Kim Il-sung reported to the Fifth Korean Workers’ Party Congress in 1970 that the people could be classified into three political groups: a loyal “core class,” a suspect “wavering class,” and a politically unreliable “hostile class.”

In the official doctrine, people are considered as “one body” which seems to be another translation of Juche:

Article 10:

The DPRK bases itself on the political and ideological unity of the entire people based on the worker-peasant alliance in which the working class plays a leading role.

The State strengthens the ideological revolution and revolutionizes and working-classizes all the social members, and binds the whole society in a united group, linked up with comradeship.

Interestingly enough, Article 12 does imply a class system and preservation of the dictatorship:

Article 12

The State shall adhere to the class line, strengthen the dictatorship of people ’s democracy and firmly defend the people’s power and socialist system against all subversive acts of hostile elements at home and abroad.

Very powerful statement there, and this seems to differ frm the other communist types I have read because most communist systems are “classless”, and this clearly shows a class system and strengthening the dictatorship. However, the last article tends to contradict itself, but hey, this is North Korea.

Also, suppression of outside influences are defined:

Article 41

The DPRK shall develop a truly popular, revolutionary culture which serves the socialist working people.

In building a socialist national culture, the State shall oppose the cultural infiltration of imperialism and any tendency to return to the past, protect its national cultural heritage, and develop it in keeping with the existing socialist situation.

Isolation is the one of the key factors to Juche, and the more closed the society is, the better chance of regime survival. This is starting to break down, but has not broken down completely because of thew Songun and fear factors. All outside media is strictly controlled as you well know, and as long as people are fed propaganda the DPRK is the best place in the world, people will start to believe it. Comparisons from other places are twisted and any indications of seeing anything foreign is simply out of the question.

Also, corruption is said to exist with normal people as well:

North Korean society is full of corruption. A North Korean’s political history, and the history of his or her parents, grandparents, and even distant relatives, does indeed influence that person’s life chances. But what matters even more is money.

North Korea’s socialist economy does not work. Most people live in poverty. Millions are constantly hungry. Government and party officials, including members of the several police and party organizations that compile and use this political information, bend the rules to make life better for themselves and their families.

I don’t think it is an exaggeration to say that North Korean society runs on bribes. It has become a way of life: a universal tax in a country that boasts that its people are free of taxation. All of the necessities that I mentioned above—employment, food, medical care, housing and place of residence—can be purchased illegally. Protection from arrest or release from jail is likewise for sale. Only if one’s case comes to the personal attention of Kim Jong-il, who has everything, is bribery of no use.

In closing, let me suggest what this information about political classification tells us about North Korea’s social structure. That structure is broken. North Korea is not in fact a socialist economic system. Almost everyone turns to the underground market economy to survive. There is no rule of law. Only the rule of money and power.

This is probably the only way the non-elite can survive, and the increase in defectors bribing guards is apparent. This is not news at all, but the comparison of the official line versus reality are two different things altogether. If you pay, the guards will look the other way… sometimes.

I have to say this system cannot sustain this way forever, and at some point:

Yet because most North Koreans cannot leave their country, and because none of them can contest the political system, social disorder in North Korea remains largely contained, and will continue to be contained until people become aware of political alternatives to living under the Kim regime.

That is the key right there. Until people become aware of the political alternatives to living under the Kim regime. As I stated before, the increase of outside (and showing others the truth about the inside) constant shortages of food, disregard for basic needs, corruption, and natural disasters may well hit the core of even the privileged and may cause serious problems. We may be seeing the beginning of the end soon, but that as been speculated before, and the regime kept going… by a thread anyway.

Therefore, the bottom line is, the DPRK justifies the suppression of information as protecting the people from the evil influences of the outside while maintaining the god -like images of the leaders in place and finally making sure people are minded at all times via thought and action police.

Lastly, propaganda is central to the regime’s survival. Thwart the inevitable wave of information everywhere these days, the propaganda spending as increased. Juche is nothing but propaganda. Everywhere is something about the leaders, the outside world, Americans, and the need for the loving care of the Kims.

3. Keep the outside world guessing what is going on in the DPRK and present a happy and prosperous front.

This is probably the best known aspect of Juche: Keep a good image. That is paramount for outsiders coming in and those looking in. Everything remains closed, and the truth of real matters are shut off to the outside world. I am sure you have seen many documentaries, pictures and writings about how great North Korea is. “It seems like an expensive show” said one commentator in the documentary Children of the Secret State.

Cracks in the facade are appearing rapidly though even in the showcase capital, Pyongyang. Few cars, power outages, crumbling buildings, traffic guards instead of traffic lights, and the most obvious of all, the Ryugyong Hotel. Now with the current flooding, the attempts at showing the happy face of North Korea may slip away because WFP workers are allowed back for the first time in years, and maybe, just maybe, the illusion may crumble away. Like Enron, lies cannot sustain themselves for very long. That remains to be seen when that will happen, but right now, the illusion seems to be in place.

What is ironic about all this show is outsiders are not buying it no matter what lengths the DPRK government goes to make it seem so. That has been known for a long time, but the question is, when will people finally wake up and see what is really going on? Once people taste freedom, that may well be the end for Kim Jong Il. Will the current crisis be exploited for the benefit of the people? That is doubtful because a hard landing is something the region does not want. Sooner or later, it will come out of nowhere, and that will mean a tiny problem for Kim Jong Il and the surrounding area. I am bracing myself for it, and it will not be pretty at all.

No changing of the Juche doctrine will fix that, and that is one of the main flaws of Juche. Foolhardy claims and Utopian wishes are just that. Empty, meaningless and downright silly. Yes, it may have worked for a time being because North Korea has the Soviet nipple to feed from, and once that was gone, the problems were apparent. Juche is a big irony. It is not a philosophy of self reliance, but a system of begging. It has been that way the entire time. Yes, people had it better in the beginning and even rivaled the south. As time passed, bottlenecks occurred, tragedy struck, bills were not paid, and it was all downhill from there.

Yet the official line continues. That is simply for regime survival.

4. Punish those that do not comply if they buy it or not.

This is pretty self explainatory just like the last point. Most people who follow this stuff knows of the brtual punishments dished by North Korea to retain power and control the minds and hearts of the masses. On the other hand, it may be interesting to see this a little deeper. Not just ordinary citizens are punished, but on all levels. Nobody is immune from the swift death order from the Kims. That is why loyalty (real or faked) is so front and center in life. The less tainted the background, the more loyalty shown to leaders and the more praises piled on them will lead to some happiness. The thing is though, happiness for the leader is top of the agenda. In fact, Juche kind of reminds me more of feudalism than communism. I am not alone:

In North Korea, however, presents to the king are still required, though the regime declares that social classes no longer exist. People dedicate their meat, produce, and fur to the Dear Leader while their children go hungry and under clothed.

Then if it is a classless system, why Article 12? This is really bothering me, and perhaps somebody could clear this mystery. Hwang Jang Yop tells it better than I can. After all, he did help write the book on Juche, even though is ideas are still way out there:

The confrontation between the South and North is not a confrontation between socialism and capitalism but that of capitalism and feudalism. The current North Korea has nothing to do with socialism. How can a society where its people, the workers, farmers and intellectuals are starving to death be called a society of socialism? There was a socialist system of extreme dictatorship in Soviet Russia but there has been no such hereditary one-man dictatorship like the one in North Korea today.

Kim Jong-il was described from birth as “a bright star who will lead and destined to succeed his father’s place. As there is a lack of sufficient adjectives to deify this father’s son, natural phenomena is now used to mystify the “Great General.” The Labor Party’s paper “Nodong Shinmun” has even publicly propagate such superstition that whenever the Great General takes pictures, the rain stops for sunshine and skies cleared and the fog would clear to protect the Great General.

In the former Soviet Union, there was criticism on Stalin’s personal worship and in other socialist countries, democratization was even pursued but on the contrary in North Korea, a “leadership theory” was formulated demanding absolute personal respect to an individual and this theory became the basis of party construction, party activities and all government policies.

In North Korea, praising the Great Leader and pledging the loyalty and piety to the leader has become a normal procedure starting from dawn and continuing throughout the day. This appalling situation seems to have even sickened the Great Leader.

The so-called organization activity is filled with praising the leader and pledging loyalty from morning until night. It is extremely regretful that young students in South Korea do not understand that North Korea is not socialist but feudalistic and that they still have some expectations from North Korea.

I do not think it is just South Koreans dear Hwang, but a lot of folks. I do not think even North Koreans regard Juche as feudalism-like, and many may disagree with me on this. That is fine, but that’s what Juche reminds me of.

The level of arrogance of the Great General can be seen in a phrase sent to the Party organization on December 7, 1996, which stated “the reason that the people are accepting unconditionally the orders from the Party Central Committee is solely due to my authority and not due to the work of the party organization and the good work of the members of the party.”

“Now there is no worker who helps my work appropriately. I am working alone.”

The Great General has begun to think of himself really as a genius because everyone praises him as one. So he has forced personal respect upon himself alone and created a dictatorship requiring unconditional following and is now blatantly saying that he has to work alone without any help from his subordinates. He takes praise for all good performances and puts the blame on others when things go wrong. That is the secret of his “greatness.”

The people in the North are experiencing the worst suffering. 2 million tons of grain is in shortage as the people have to supply grain to the military unconditionally and so the farmers take out 3 months of grain from their own households to the military. There are many absent students from school. However, the papers and broadcasts say North is the paradise on earth and the model country of socialism envied by people from all over the world. The Great Leader is the l eader of the world revolution and the savior of the world. The people are crying “Long Live the Great General” on order to survive in the dark land filled with terrible suppression, lies and deceit.

This I have to agree with. Te whole crux of the paper resides in that paragraph right above these words.

Even in feudal societies, farmers’ riots have broken out in such a situation but the dictatorship is so rigid and oppression is so ruthless that it is difficult to expect the people of the North to overcome this situation at their own strength.

That may be true, but in Hwang’s own words, the military is the only thing keeping the country together (as well as the unchecked aid I must add). With the army, secret police, and minders everywhere, the people are successfully contained. Once the support of the military and the aid are gone (or some severe breakdown of one or the other) can very well cause things to fall apart. I mean people are starting to get an idea what the outside world is like, and most are keeping mum because of fear. What is that fear?

One word: Gulags.

It does not really matter what Juche means once a person is sent to the camps. Chances of survival are very slim, and punishments are given out like candy. Joshua tells these tales of woe in greater detail than I could ever wish to describe, and those punishments are described in very vivid detail including video. That is a must read.

Juche is the path to collapse

When all is said and done, Juche is a feel-good philosophy and based on pipe dreams as said many times before. The thought cannot be be put in practice because after a while, it will fall apart. That is why a succession may also lead to collapse as well. I simply cannot see the cult of personality going on for the simple fact there is simply not enough time for vast indoctrination as the other Kims had. In fact, Kim Jong Il is on a borrowed cult of personality, and without his father, he would have been gone a long time ago. Yes, he reformulated the Juche Idea to match his style of leadership, but can a successor successfully reformulate it and survive? Doubtful. Kim Jong Il does not have the charisma to sustain a successor in time for the next leader to sustain itself.

Once a new leader is named, will more monuments be erected? Will people have to add another portrait to the wall? Are there going to be new lapels made? If Kim Jong Il were to die tomorrow, will there be a frenzy of monument building to the next leader? The very idea seems very silly to me, but what do I know? I am just an outsider looking in. Anything could happen, and I am kind of looking forward to seeing the next story, and I am even more eager to see the Juche Idea come to an end.

Next in the series is what could happen once the regime falls? I mean to do that first, but this was a good way to set up the next part. Thank you for reading, and if you have any corrections suggestions or ways to improve this, I would be most appreciative.

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