The usual disclaimers apply to this post like all the other postings.

In the last posting, I made a feeble attempt at trying to imagine bottom-up dissent and the problems that it could cause for Kim Jong Il if he were alive. All along, I have been doing possibilities in the event something goes wrong if he were alive. The next question that is even more unclear (and completely unknown) is what happens if Kim Jong Il should die?

Timing may be the key to possible regime survival.

Kim looks like crap.

A video was recently released of Kim Jong Il at Hamhung. He does not look very healthy, but looks can be deceiving like anything else in North Korea. Rumors abound regarding his health, especially the reports of a stroke in 2008. From the pictures, it does look like he did have a stroke, and when a video was released when meeting with the Supreme Peoples Assembly, he had trouble walking, looked gaunt, and had a noticeable sag on his face. People live through strokes, and may not be the end of Kim Jong Il. After all, he does have access to health care away from his free health care in the worker’s paradise. On the other hand, it did not help his father when he suddenly keeled over from a heart attack in 1994. Yeah, he lived to the ripe old age of 82, and there is no telling when Kim Jong Il will die, but if trends of history are right, Kim Jong Il will see a fate everybody else will. With that fact in mind, I have been thinking what in the world is going on regarding plans for succession if any. So far, again, there are only rumors. Now here is something that was really interesting looking for information in the rumor mill:

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il apparently had age spots removed from his face to look healthy but is becoming more and more fretful and dependent on old friends or family, the National Intelligence Service said in a report at the National Assembly’s Intelligence Committee on Tuesday.

Kim is constantly accompanied by his sister Kyong-hee (64), the head of the Workers Party’s light industry department, and her husband Jang Song-taek (64), the director of the party’s administration department.

Emphasis mine. This is really, really interesting, because recall Jerrold M. Post’s prediction:

[...] [Kim Jong Il] reportedly maintains a small, close-knit circle of advisers and allies on whom he relies, although he probably only fully trusts his sister and brother in law. His younger sister, Kim Jyung Hee, is among the most trusted of his advisers. She heads the light-industry division of the of the Workers Party Economic Policy Audit Department and is one of the few people in North Korea who has direct and and unlimited access to Kim Jong Il. Her husband, Chang Song-taek, the senior vice-director of the KWP Organization and Guidance Department [...]

Emphasis mine. This can mean a lot of things, and since I do not have the book, I did not read the rest of the entry. I really should buy the book just for that alone. I would also be interested in other leaders, but I will have to look for those. At any rate, that is very interesting how the reports and his analysis seem to fit. Alright, so Kim relies on his sister and brother in law, but it still does not answer as to how the regime will head any time soon. What I have stated many times before was the path the father and son took to succession, which started sometime in the mid 1970’s, and made public in 1980. By the time it was made public, Kim Il Sung was around 68. That is an odd number considering the rumors floating about succession rumors, and the current being Kim Jong Eun. According to some speculation, Jang Song Thaek or some other mentor could be in the background grooming another successor, and that could be true, but who knows what goes on behind the scenes.

The point is, timing will most likely be of the essence if Kim wants a smooth succession, and like 1994, there were wild rumors the regime would not survive a Kim Jr. rule. Again, they were not making a bad bet (Noland/Haggard, 221) because of all the problems facing North Korea at the time. Today, serious problems still exist, but the problems seem a little different. That makes sense, because time and circumstances change. I see two possibilities: Kim croaks and there is no successor, or Kim croaks and there is  a successor. Obviously, the two will have very different outcomes, and each one presents its own challenges not only internally, but external as players try to assess the new situation.

Kim Jong Il dies with a successor. This could happen, but a seemingly big problem remains; there is little evidence of a mass propaganda campaign to build up a new leader. As of right now, it may not be a big thing if Kim Jong Il plans to go a similar route as his father, because there are rumors of a successor like his own succession from the mid 70’s to the time he was publicly announced in 1980. The difference is, it appears the rumors have started later than his own succession. In the 1970’s, Kim Jong Il’s portrait would appear next to his father’s, and the odd “party center” would also appear. Of course, during what seemed like a “disappearing act” in the late 1970’s, Kim Jong Il would return to the scene in what was speculated as a power struggle. Obviously, Kim Jong Il prevailed, and once he was named, that was it. In the current rumor mill, there is no evidence of Kim Jong Eun’s portrait being next to Kim Jong Il or his grandfather. If Kim Jong Il is planning a similar succession plan as his father, a lot of questions remain as to why he is waiting so long. Perhaps there is a successor, but does not want to make it public until another time. One theory is Kim Jong Il is waiting until the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung. There were also reports of Kim Jong Il banning discussion of a successor. Perhaps there were plans to name a successor, but problems cropped up such as: the rumors of China interfering in the internal affairs, the bungled currency reforms, prestige projects not being completed on time, preparations are not in place, diplomatic problems, power struggles, and the list can go on.

Another possibility is Kim Jong Il is not planning to name his son successor. There is a possibility some other family member can take the throne, and as of late, Jang Song Thaek saw a rapid rise in the ranks. Next, Post described Jang and his wife are the most trusted allies in Kim Jong Il’s close-knit entourage. What I am trying to find is if Kim Jong Il had a “mentor” to help groom his own succession (It may be buried in one of my books somewhere). It may not matter anyway, because Kim Jong Il is not Kim Il Sung, and as circumstances change, different tactics may have to be employed to ensure a successful conclusion. Like Kim Jong Eun, there is no evidence of Jang being next in line, but there is more evidence of Jang being arm in arm with Kim Jong Il. Like Kim himself, Jang saw a brief time where he was not seen at all, then suddenly comes back to the scenes more powerful than ever. Is this indicative of anything? I do not know, but it could be a small coincidence. My bet is in Jang Song Thaek because of there is more evidence, but that evidence can be deceiving when so little is known. Finally, like Kim Jong Eun or some other family member, there is no evidence of Jang Song Thaek’s own cult of personality cropping up. If he is being tapped, I do not know what the wait is for. Like the other possibilities, it could be a lot of factors. I do place my bets on this one, though.

Another thought is a collective leadership. If Kim Jong Il dies, is he egotistical enough not to care who takes over? I do not know if a de-kimmification could happen, but in the case of a collective leadership, that could be possible. Further, could Kim realize the Kim family cult is not working and make some kind of collective leadership, or the top elites  somehow convince Kim the cult is not effective anymore (As discussed with the unlikely coup scenario)? That does not seem likely in my view, because Kim seems too egotistical for that. However, what seems a good possibility if Kim should die suddenly and there were no successor, and there was no choice but to have some organ (such as the NDC for example) assume the leadership in the midst of disarray, or, some kind of figurehead is established with some group as the real power behind the scenes. That has potential for serious problems too. Is there a chance a collective leadership denounce the old ways and be reformers? In the case of Khrushchev, he was going in that direction, but his grand plans did not fare to well, such as the virgin lands campaign.

There are other possibilities I am missing here, but in the case of a successor in the Kim family under the current system, what is interesting to me is the lack of a propaganda campaign early in the grooming process. Recall in Kim Jong Il’s case his cult of personality started in pockets, and the current rumor of Kim Jong Eun showed up in the rumor mill in the form of the song lyrics bear Wonsan, and reports of pledging allegiance in support for Kim Jong Eun and the like. The only difference is, and makes me pause for a moment is the lack of the other elements classic in the Kim Sr. to Kim Jr. handover such as the adding of portraits in the 70’s (which were taken down for a time), doing his own on the spot guidance, and endless videos of him and his father shoulder to shoulder solving the problems for the happiness of the Korean people. Never know, there could be another plan in place, as I said before. Whatever the case may be in the Kim family sphere is the population has to be groomed too. They have to get another good story. What the AgitProp Department will do is unknown to me, but some have shown up here and there about Kim Jong Eun on how his cult is forming:

A new film stressing the importance of continuing the “Mt. Paektu bloodline” is making a big splash in North Korea, state media said on July 16, amid reports of an imminent second hereditary power succession.

“A white birch of Mt. Paektu,” an art-house film produced in early June, centers on the idea that the future of North Korea depends upon “purely succeeding the Mt. Paektu bloodline,” the (North) Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.

“This movie is bringing a big repercussion in the military and among the people, especially the young, and will contribute to arming the People’s Army soldiers, workers and young students with the Mt. Peaktu bloodline,” the KCNA said.

KCNA links added by me. I could not find the other quotes. While the links I found could indicate something, it is not proof by any standard. If this good son-bloodline story is to be concocted, the guys in the propaganda department have their work cut out for them. Further, will a population as seemingly zombified by sixty-plus years of indoctrination in a changing economic and world stage even buy the stories anymore? In other words, will it take more work to perpetuate a lie while at the same time convincing the Kim dynastic Juche system is still viable? That is not known, like anything else in this posting, but it is clear Kim better get moving if he wants to make a smooth succession, at least in the propaganda. Finally, another question is, in the handover from father to son Kim, did the population just buy the propaganda outright because of the Confucian basis in culture? The main problem with that is, Kim Jong Eun is not old enough to be seen as a “father figure”, but perhaps the twisted nature of Juche may emphasize carrying on the legacy of the elder, and somehow is more brilliant than the ordinary man. Kim Jong Il was never in the military, and was essentially a spoiled brat with a silver spoon in his mouth and always got his way. Therefore, a whole host of fabrications had to be invented to build him up, unlike his father (with gross exaggerations), who had a legitimate resume. To be sure, nobody knows the resume of Kim Jong Eun, so it remains to be seen what happens if any.

Alright, so what about the timing? If Kim Jong il should die before the successor is groomed long enough to let it settle in the hearts and minds of the DPRK masses, will it matter? Could the successor still convince the population he is brilliant enough to carry on the so-called bloodline of Mt. Paektu and lead the state to glory, or will the masses be required to worship the new leader as he is rushed to the podium? Unless the deep-seeded problems are dealt with, the rotting from the inside out is going to continue.

I am not going to rule out succession will not be possible this time around (recall 1994), but I believe it is going to be more difficult depending on how the population receives the new leader. As more of the population drifts away from the ideology by doing what is best for the state with no reward, all the while getting shafted for the basic needs promised by the state not being delivered, I can see why the marketization is taking place. It appears the population goes through the motions of leader worship while scraping by. I cannot see how this will work with so many variables presented, but obviously, I am interested to see where this is going as is watchers of the regime. Could the population reject the new leader? It is not likely, but it could be possible if things are not planned carefully. I cannot say with any amount of accuracy what kind of planning is taking place behind the fortified walls of the forbidden city.

The so-called “cooperative engagement” scenario means the regime has not changed, just the leader’s mindset. Obviously, the international community will be carefully watching the new leader’s decisions to see what will happen next (as others like this blog). Not only will it be a race against the clock to see if negotiations are possible, and all the usual maneuvering. What kind of new tactics will be employed to deal with it? As Lankov pointed out, it does not appear anybody is prepared for such events. We know for a fact Kim is going to die, but I have not seen anything in the discussions in Washington or elsewhere openly discussing the possibilities. Maybe that is because of the sensitivity of the issue. Do the OPLANs include successful leadership transition? Maybe it does not matter, because the regime is still in place, but have they considered the differences in leadership style that may come about? What if a de-kimmification were to happen, or a regime more repressive than the previous one, or a host of other issues? I have not seen the OPLANs, so I cannot say.

Whatever the case may be, maintaining stability is going to be key. I ma just hoping the plans are in place to deal with it.

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Emperor Casino in Rajin

I have written about this oddity in the past, and since that time, found a lot more information. I am sure more will crop up, but I believe this should be alright.

In 2005, the Casino was shut down, and I have not seen a word on it since. Apparently, it is just sitting there, but who knows what it is being used for now (probably nothing). According to linked story, the Emperor Casino in the off-the-beaten path Rajin special economic zone, has a colorful history. From Chinese public money spending scandals to suicides from a high room windows. Little details about how the mess was cleaned up is not clear.

The guy who runs the empire is a reportedly shady character named Albert Yeung, who is said to have ties with the Communist Party of China and the Triads. I would guess that would make him not only an important man, but somebody to fear. He denies the connections, though (I would too if I had those kinds of connections). What is even more interesting, is this casino has a competitor in North Korea. Here are the casinos in question, and the only two I could find:

Emperor Casino in Rajin

Possible location of Ho's casino in the forbidden city.

Even more colorful anecdotes come from the link regarding the competitor. I doubt little is known about the casino in the forbidden city, as with everything else in there. Apparently, a big party was held in Kim Jr.’s honor; and why not? Kim Jong Il is the life of the party according to many anecdotes including Kenji Fujimoto. The bottom line is, as long as somebody has the right price, Kim Jong Il will put his ideology aside and look the other way.

According to The Standard:

Yeung elevated himself to the top ranks of foreign investors in North Korea with his HK$1.4 billion [USD$180 million in today's currency rates] investment in the Emperor Hotel & Casino, which opened in Rason town in 1999.

Brackets mine. That is a lot of money to invest in North Korea, but hey, it is off the beaten path, and anybody with serious money could go there and spend all the money they wanted. Again, too bad that led to serious problems when public money was frittered away. I guess that led to one source of hard currency went away. I guess that does not matter when North Korea has other avenues to pursue like counterfeits (dollars to cigarettes), weapons, and drugs.

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Hillary will meet a defector – I wish human rights were actually a priority:

Lee was chosen as one of 10 outstanding women leaders around the world at the recommendation of U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Kathleen Stephens. A diplomatic source said one motivation is to evoke interest in the human rights situation in North Korea.

I will celebrate when the issue of the hundreds of thousands of voiceless and faceless people are actually a concern. Kim is still running many concentration camps, and as things heat up, will most likely send out more. So next time at the round table talks, will the issue be discussed? As for the defector, my hat is off to you for making a better life in the face of more than likely horrific odds.

Iran getting help from North Korea? – With the cash crunch in North Korea, this may not come as a surprise. One question I have is, with the failed launch of the TD-2, why is Iran wanting North Korean help? I guess there could be many reasons why, after all, Syria reportedly had a North Korean reactor that Israel destroyed to smithereens. With these kinds of bedfellows, who knows what kind of mayhem can ensue. Further, North Korea has been sending out arms shipments despite the sanctions. Maybe goody-time for North Korea is not a very good idea.

Yawn… North Korea ruffles feathers on the war exercises – Time and again, the North protests and stamps feet like it always does. If they actually do something, let me know.

North Korea’s food shortages continue – Most likely, will not see overflowing abundance any time soon, unfortunately. The incentives look enticing in the wake of the very ugly currency devaluation:

Civic group North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity said the party held seminars at party chapters on Feb. 23 promising W10,000 in cash and 120 kg of food for households if they voluntarily move to farms.

Emphasis mine. Sounds pretty good, but as always, there is a catch:

The regime is afraid of the possibility of mounting public discontent if it forces people to relocate at a time when they are seething in the wake of a disastrous currency reform. The regime is giving indoctrination classes to senior officials to move to rural areas and urging them to set an example, news media speculated.

But the group said such efforts would not be effective in persuading ordinary North Koreans to move to rural areas because living conditions there are very bad. “It’s very likely that the regime will end up forcibly relocating them,” it added.

Yeah, that sounds about right. With a history of the regime not following up on promises, I would also guess some may not believe it either. However, if they complain, we all know what happens.

Some sad news about Park – When Park was released, a shockingly detached man shuffled to an awaiting car not saying a word. I speculated (like some others) something was very, very wrong. According to the linked article, if the reports are true (I do not doubt it), he is in for a very, very long road to recovery. The decision to go there was probably not the best idea in the world, but nobody deserves that kind of treatment. Then again, this is North Korea. They are not exactly known for hugs and lollipops. On the other hand, it does not diminish the severity of the things he reportedly experienced. I cannot imagine such a trauma.

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In the last part of this series, I really jumped off the cliff in the speculation game. Chances are, I will probably look at this later and shake my head wondering why I wrote such a thing. Therefore, the usual disclaimers apply to this posting, as well as all the other postings.

How would Kim Jong Il react to a bottom-up revolt?

In part 3, I haphazardly groped in the dark in trying to speculate how things could go if Kim were to face a coup attempt from the top. As said before, this is probably highly unlikely. Problem with that is, like anything else regarding the future, nobody knows what is going to happen, so I guess sometimes the seemingly impossible becomes possible. As that old saying goes, “truth is sometimes stranger than fiction”. The next question I ask myself is, how would Kim Jong Il react to massive bottom-up dissent?

New DPRK banknotes (source unknown)

North Korea is well-known for its horrific treatment of its people. The concentration camps, shortages, blackouts, broken infrastructure, extreme isolation, no basic freedoms many take for granted (like movement), famine, reckless reforms, a huge percentage of GDP going to arms, and the list seems to go on forever. With this kind of treatment, I am still amazed little has happened from below that would show a serious threat to the Kim regime, because it is obviously still going.

I still cannot help but wonder if there will come a time when even a very controlled people will not take it anymore. In the case of the currency revaluation last year, that hurt a lot of people trying to get by and feed themselves. There were reports of protest which is almost unheard of (although some protests did happen in the past with a quick end), and caused the regime to make a rare admission the reforms were bungled. Not surprisingly, it was not Kim Jong Il who messed things up, but Pak Nam Gi, who was later sacked. Whatever happened to him, I do not know, but it goes to show this: Scapegoating when plans don’t work out. Since narcissists must be seen as perfect, when one of Kim’s plans misfires, the problem is not in the concept but the execution. Thus, Kim is ready to scapegoat when his plans don’t work out. It appears this has been the case since the inception of the Kim kingdom, because for decades, if something went wrong, it was the fault of ROK, United States, sanctions, the threat of war, and many other things. Does the population really believe these things? It is very difficult to tell in a population self-censoring because of fear, or spouting the line because they actually believe. It could be a combination of both, but if one looks at the Peterson Institute’s survey of defectors going to China (way before the recent currency reforms, but after the 2002 reforms), almost all report being dis-satisfied with the regime. Not only being dis-satisfied with the regime, but a majority knowing aid was coming in, but felt they were not the beneficiaries of that aid, and even a larger percentage believed that aid was going to the military. (Migration Experiences and Exit Polls).

According to Markets, Aid, and Reform, economic hardships are not the only factors to weigh in regime change:

With respect to protest from below, famine, recurrent food shortages, and large-scale un- and under-employment would seem a politically lethal mix. But the current regime can draw on two generations of unparalleled political indoctrination and a massive apparatus for internal social control. Accounts of anti-regime activity have surfaced periodically, but usually with the conclusion that they were dealt with swiftly and brutally.

Today, NKEconWatch linked to an article which I looked at with glee. Andrei Lankov lent his two cents on the current situation in the DPRK, and seemed funny that came out while I was writing this. No, I do not think he or anybody else saw this series, but I am saying it does help in my understanding of what might be happening. Without reiterating my more than likely disastrous analysis on it, I think it is safe to go ahead and consider the possibilities Lankov was very careful not to tread. Which is the smart thing to do. Since I have nothing to lose, time to jump off the cliff again…

The massive challenges facing bottom up dissent is not only the pervasive cult of personality and  the internal security apparatus, but the extreme difficulty if not near-impossibility to assemble to form a grassroots revolt (Noland/Haggard, 224, 225). Furthermore, as the citation discusses, there is little refuge or safety valve for organization. The ROK is difficult to gather mass discontent among North Koreans because not only the small numbers of North Koreans living there, but the fear of what their families will face. Secondly, China is on the lookout for North Koreans and wants nothing to do with them, so there is fear of getting sent back to North Korea. This is clearly in violation of UN human rights initiatives, but North Korea and China, in my opinion, have some deal going to keep their population in check. As Markets, Aid, and Reform points out, North Korea is not like the Eastern Bloc. The USSR is long gone, USSR had a big hand in the collapse of the economy, and the world has moved on. North Korea is an extremely isolated state, and everyday, it appears that isolation is only getting worse with the reckless and stupid decisions by the North Korean government, or Kim Jong Il himself.

If a population feels there is little to lose, I could imagine pockets of discontent form. While that will cause a serious bloodbath, the internal security cannot control everybody all at once. What I am saying is, if there is enough discontent, and gains enough momentum, that could be disastrous for the Kim Jong Il regime. What is more, if the discontent happens in elite section of the population, it could be even worse. I can see if the regime is not able to blackmail and/or bribe loyalty within the elites, military, or security, could the security and/or army drop their weapons in protest, or worse, turn the guns on the regime itself? It seems impossible right now, but seems like a possibility.

What is even worse, the propaganda of a worker’s paradise would be irreversibly marred. I think that is even worse than the protests themselves. As word leaks out (if it is large scale, there is little chance it will stay just there), Kim Jong Il’s regime will be the laughing stock of the world even more than it is today. There is no doubt it will make headlines everywhere, and the international community will be right there watching things unfold. I cannot even to begin to fathom the enormity of the events. I also believe a coup from the top could be kept under wraps longer than dissent from below.

Assume for a moment if the dissent grows to something large scale. How would Kim react to such events? Some possibilities off the top of my head:

* Attempts to stop the protests by having the KPA and other security to enforce martial law (yes, even more so than it is now).

* If it gets worse, ordering the security and/or KPA to attempt arrests and/or summary killings to break the protests up.

With the last bullet point, that is where it could either be successful or just another protest broken up because the army and/or security is still loyal to the regime. Realistically, the normal population by and large, may not have the resources necessary to duke it out in the streets with the hundreds of thousands of troops with itchy trigger fingers. Next, goes right back to the huge problem of organizing the protests themselves. I cannot see a large number of people getting together to discuss the problems of the regime. It is almost certain security will get wind of such organization and disband it with fierce punishment. All the while making examples of them in a public square somewhere with blindfolds and soldiers pointing rifles at them. Another near-impossibility is ability to “spread the word” in an efficient manner. Any handbills, posters, whispers (never know who is an informant), or means to covertly or overtly spread the protest via counter-propaganda will be met with just as equal brutality. Finally, somebody will need deep pockets to bribe officials to travel one place to another.

The only way I can see this happening is if the core section of the loyal Kim Jong Il apparatus were to lose their own livelihoods and see for themselves Kim Jong Il failed to deliver on his promises. This is appears to be the basis of Lankov’s argument of something happening in North Korea (among a few other tidbits). If this were to happen, the only way this could be successful is if the factions are large enough to sustain a fight and gather enough momentum among the normal population to feel bolstered enough to show that discontent and join in the protest.

Recall in the last hours of the Nicolae Ceausescu’s regime protests started in pockets and factions were fighting in the streets. This was also at the same time where the normal population were facing severe food shortages, blackouts, freezing to death in their homes, and entire towns getting demolished to make Nicolae’s beloved People’s Palace. I understand Romania is very, very different from North Korea, because Romanians were more than likely inspired to protest in the wake of other bottom-up discontent in other Eastern Bloc states. In North Korea’s case, they do not have that luxury, so more than likely will have to go about it alone, which in of itself is a strong deterrent. Finally, Kim Jong Il may have taken the steps necessary to prevent such an occurrence when the end of the Eastern Bloc and USSR took place.

With these factors in mind, assume the fighting and protests gathered enough momentum to turn against Kim Jong Il’s regime. Say large sections of a hungrier KPA and security detail were to drop their weapons and/or turn their weapons against the loyalists. It seems logical to me the regular population could be inspired by that, but again, I cannot see that happening unless there is mutual discontent along the way to gather such momentum. Alright, assume the “perfect storm” were to brew. How would Kim Jong Il react?

* Attempts to rally the loyalists to stick with him and his plans for a better tomorrow, and do whatever it takes to stop the protests.

* Attempts to have somebody (I cannot see Kim doing it himself like Ceausescu did in his bungled speech) calm the masses by counter-propaganda. I cannot see the regime making direct threats to the protesters, but threatening others for infiltrating their paradise. Furthermore, I cannot see them actually following through with the threats with war, because they already know they cannot do so, and their goal is survival. However, I can see, despite the calming words, mass killings and arrests in an attempt to stop the meltdown in social order.

* Attempts at declaring martial law, and keeping things as quiet as possible, for as long as possible. There are plenty of places to kill mass amounts of people, and no matter the case, cannot see it going down without some kind of fight. Again, it could be unsuccessful, but that kind of protest will eventually get out and the entire structure of the already fragile myth will most likely start to evaporate.

* If the discontent is successful, I cannot see Kim Jong Il sticking around. He already has a fragile ego and health, and may attempt to hide. I can also see him in his “forbidden city” as his last line of refuge trying to keep his loyal circle with him. As rumored in the “forbidden city” oddity posting, Kim has some kind of secret basement or tunnel system. Is that similar to the bunker in Germany during the Cold War? I am not sure. Further, could Kim try and escape to some safe haven in another location or country? Honestly, with somebody like Kim Jong Il, it seems like he would be difficult to remain hidden, but so is Osama Bin Laden, yet he has not been captured. I cannot imagine Kim Jong Il committing suicide either, because he probably believes in his own brilliance and will probably blame others for the failure to keep his regime in order. Could that also mean his loyal circle could be disbanded and/or killed? Probably not, because he relies on others to maintain his belief of brilliance. Maybe his inner circle could abandon him to save themselves, but I cannot see that happening.

Along the way of these events, I cannot see the international community sitting idly by waiting for things to unfold on their own. It is almost a certainty if something like this were to happen, it would be a logistical and diplomatic nightmare, if it happens at the top or bottom. Like the other scenario, stability will be key.

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Dr. Andrei Lankov

Yes kids, it is must read material time again, and NKEconWatch delivers. Andrei Lankov wrote a piece in Asian Times about the current happenings in North Korea. Now as all North Korea watchers I know, know, Lankov is one of the few North Korea watchers who can be called the closest to an expert one can get. This goes along with the series I have been writing about, but if Lankov says something about it, chances are, that is more plausible and coherent than I could ever hope to do. So what did he have to say? In a nutshell, something is happening in North Korea, and it may seriously backfire.

As  have been writing in part 4 (not finished yet) of the post divided Korea series, bottom-up discontent has been on the increase in the news as damaged as it may be, because of the lack of independent verification. However, as Lankov pointed out (and I did not know, but now know):

Meanwhile, the North Korean government also did something it has never done before: it said “sorry” to the people. In January, Nodong Sinmun, a government mouthpiece, reported that Dear Leader Kim Jong-il felt bad for being unable to provide his subjects with the level of material affluence they were once promised.

Emphasis mine. So it appears the government has never said sorry to the people before. I was looking for instances when writing the series, and now I know why I could not find it. It does not exist, and it makes perfect sense as to why - Great insecurity, preoccupation with one’s own brilliance or appearance. Because of the need to be perfect, it is difficult to impart new information to him, and he reacts negatively to criticism. I am very sure Kim Jong Il is very aware of the problems, as he knew when he made his statement at Kim Il Sung University. Problem with these instances are, as covered in Policy Elites, is information is most likely censored because officials are afraid to tell him what is really going on. Hence, the thing that could lead to his downfall - A tendency to surround himself with sycophants who tell him what he wants to hear, rather than what he needs to hear, making him out of touch with political reality. However, he is likely to know the problems, but is still out of touch with political reality because Lankov writes:

One can easily imagine how the Dear Leader (perhaps even driven by genuine sympathy to his long-suffering people) would look through a currency reform plan and say: “And what about poor wage-earners? Should we not reward the people who remained loyal to the socialist industry and did not go for black markets? Why not increase their salaries, so they will become affluent, more affluent than those anti-socialist profiteers of the black market?” Few, if any, officials would dare to explain the dire economic consequences of such generosity.

Emphasis mine. So, the reforms were enacted on Kim’s orders (it had to be Kim, with the other officials nodding “yes, yes” jotting every “precious” word), it backfired, and Pak Nam Gi was sacked and sent to Pete knows where. Which goes along with – Scapegoating when plans don’t work out. Since narcissists must be seen as perfect, when one of Kim’s plans misfires, the problem is not in the concept but the execution. Thus, Kim is ready to scapegoat when his plans don’t work out. The issue seems to be, according to Lankov, these games are starting to fall apart. Especially with the bone-headed currency devaluation scheme, which could of been because of, as Lankov said:

One can easily imagine how the Dear Leader (perhaps even driven by genuine sympathy to his long-suffering people) would look through a currency reform plan and say: “And what about poor wage-earners? Should we not reward the people who remained loyal to the socialist industry and did not go for black markets? Why not increase their salaries, so they will become affluent, more affluent than those anti-socialist profiteers of the black market?” [...]

Emphasis mine. It does not seem to “fit” in the profile Post suggested, because Kim only cares about Kim. So standing in his own shoes, I could imagine Kim Jong Il showing a facade of sympathy, but perhaps is stressing out wondering why things are not going as planned. Or worse, if he fears losing absolute control, love for/to himself, or if he fears somebody is plotting something against him personally. I seriously doubt it is out of genuine concern for his underlings toiling away in the salt mines, but “what is in it for me”. Lankov makes this point as well:

Their country’s economy is in a sorry state, to be sure, but survival of the population has never been a major item on their agenda. They just want to stay in control and not be overthrown by popular insurrection or by a coup – they are very good at this game.

So I am probably re-hashing the same thing, making an otherwise well-thought out analysis a mess (I apologize, Mr. Lankov). The main crux of the Kim Jong Il regime problem, as of late, according to Lankov is possibly two-fold. Internally, the attempt at bringing the old system back on track was a spectacular failure, and the regime is perhaps scrambling to find a solution not only to the economic problems on top, but the bottom-up marketization. The other is the international community’s collective yawn, making Kim stamp his feet in the hopes of negotiations and concessions. As Lankov writes:

In the realm of diplomacy, North Korea is not faring much better. For decades, Pyongyang has demonstrated uncanny skills in manipulating its neighbors fom whom it squeezed unconditional aid and unilateral concessions. The usual tactics consisted of three stages. In the first stage, the North Koreans raise tensions. Secondly, they launch missiles, test nuclear devices and make threatening statements. Finally, once tensions are sufficiently high for the world to feel uneasy, there are negotiations in which Pyongyang extracts aid that is essentially a reward for calming a crisis the North itself manufactured.

This time, both stage one and stage two were seriously mishandled. First, the North Koreans used both their trump blackmail cards – a nuclear test and a missile launch – almost simultaneously (analysts expected space of at least a few months before these two events). They also showered Washington with especially bellicose rhetoric, even though the Barack Obama administration was initially relatively soft on the North Korean issue.

As a result, the excessive activity of the North Koreans backfired: the US foreign policy establishment finally realized that North Korea would not surrender its nuclear program under whatever circumstances. This reassessment of the situation (or belated realization) meant that the US was now far less willing to shower Pyongyang with concessions. In the past, gifts were presented as incentives to surrender nuclear weapons, and since such surrender is now seen as unlikely, such generosity is not necessary. (See US finally wise to Pyongyang’s ways, Asia Times Online, November 12, 2009)

The North Koreans are now beginning to realize that the old trick is not working. They have only themselves to blame. Had they been slightly more careful last year, a significant part of the US establishment would still nurture the illusionary dream of “denuclearization through negotiations”.

The third stage of asking for aid was also handled badly. The unnecessarily aggressive rhetoric of the past was replaced by unusual softness in a short time – previously, the switch took months. Since August, North Korea has essentially begged to restart negotiations with the US and, especially, South Korea.

Pyongyang is demanding to restart cooperation projects. It is quite remarkable, since two of the three major projects – tours of Keumgang Mountain and Kaesong city tours – were abruptly stopped by North Korean authorities a year ago. Needless to say, the South Korean government is not too eager to restart negotiations. After all, so-called intra-Korean cooperation is essentially unilateral South Korean aid in disguise and Seoul sees no reason why it should hurry with the resumption of money transfers to Pyongyang. North Korean softness is (wrongly) seen by Seoul hardliners as a victory of the hard line they are advocating, so they say that an even harder approach will probably bring greater success.

Which may boil down to – Overoptimism about his own chances, and a tendency to devalue the adversary[,] and [s]aying or promising whatever is useful at the moment, with words that are strictly instrumental, to accomplish what is necessary; apparently sincere agreements are easily changed or disregarded. [...].

Something is happening in North Korea, and it does not look good. Yes, maybe things will carry on as they always had, but the bottom line is, Kim Jong Il will die one way or another, and do strongly agree:

[...]We are heading towards serious changes, and unfortunately nobody seems prepared.

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"Forbidden City" (North Korean Economy Watch)

Chongnyong Hotel – Not a whole lot of information is available for this hotel save for a few pictures here and there. I did not even see any on Flickr, unless it was named something else. Another possible name is Youth Hotel, but nothing was found on that either. However, it appears some have stayed there during tours of North Korea, so obviously somebody has been there. It does not mean they know about it per se, but I was surprised there was little about it on KCNA or Naenara. Looking around the area, I do not see the flats shown in this area. Maybe that is because the hotel is in Mangyongdae. I guess somebody needs to place that where it belongs. Oh wait, Curtis Melvin’s map already did that. I was looking at the wrong thing.

Changgwang Kindergarten – I had a hell of a time finding information on this building. I finally found it looking to an alternate spelling. According to the KCNA:

Pyongyang, September 2 (KCNA) — Changgwang kindergarten situated in the central district, Pyongyang, is focusing attention on education of children in art. The kindergarten has established studying rooms, intellectual play rooms, zoological, rooms a wading pool and service facilities to cultivate their talents. Children train their artistic talents at a cozy dancing room, a soundproof room for singing, a room of hundreds of musical instruments including pianos and all other necessary establishments for education in art.

Kindergartener An Un Sik told a reporter:

“As musical abilities are shown in childhood, their bud should be found and cultivated in time.  Our kindergarten has introduced an educational method suitable to the children’s mind to give a systematic and regular artistic education. We disseminate rhythmic exercises among children to help them have a proper violin-playing posture and teach execution in comparison with matters and phenomena.”  Many children have been praised by people as “little soloists” and “little composers” since the kindergarten was founded on September 1. Juche 71 (1982).

Its many graduates are active at the merited choir of the Korean People’s Army, the national symphony orchestra and other artistic groups as promising musicians.  Their growth shows part of the Juche-oriented education policy of the DPRK where children are called “king of the country.”

It appears there are no photos from what I could find. There are other pictures of places on Changgwang though.

Changwang Mountain House – Nothing on this house either, other than a description on Wikimapia. Of course, there is no way to verify any of these things, but since this is all I have, I guess it will have to do:

This magnificent structure was once one of the infamous homes of KWP/NDC Chairman, General Kim Jong il. It was built in the middle 1970s and was one of the homes where General Kim’s oldest son, Kim Jong-nam, grew up. Mr. Kim lived here with his maternal aunt, Song Hye-rang and her two children. Its current occupants are unknown, and General Kim may have given this home to one of his adult children.

“Forbidden City” central committee Executive apartments – From this picture, it looks like the roadblock is just as you enter the junction of Chnagwang and Haebangson Street. I wonder what their apartments look like inside?

Administration Department – I do not see any pictures of this building. Maybe that is because nobody is allowed to take any pictures of it. NK Leadership Watch (Very good site, by the way) has some information on what the Administration Department does.

Party Administration Building – According to Wikimapia:

The Party Administration Building contains, among its departments, the Organization and Guidance Department of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). The co-directors of the department represent the core ruling faction of the DPRK.

Where this information was obtained is unknown to me. I guess that’s where Jang Song Thaek hangs around?

Party History Institute (Propaganda and Agitation Department?) – According to WikiMapia, that’s what it is, however, there is no marker on Curtis’ version. He locates the Party History Institute two buildings up. I think I will trust Curtis’ location more. What this does exactly, I am not too sure, but a quick Google shows a book about Kim Il Sung, so I am going to show it has something to do with Propaganda and Agitation. Maybe North Korea has more than one department for propaganda? It is possible I suppose.Looking to the link, it appears it may be separate, but if they have different buildings is a different thing altogether. At any rate, from the PDF file:

The Propaganda and Agitation Department also links with the Organization and Guidance Department to ensure ideological continuity and coordinate personnel decisions. It is also coordinates with the General Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, although MPAF GPAD maintains a separate control system. With the Party History Institute/Party History Research Center and the Korea Documentary Film Studio, PAD develops and coordinates literature and films concerning the lives of Kim Ilsung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-suk.

Emphasis mine. If this is the function that particular department has, it would not surprise me if that had its own building. Which one it is, I do not know.

Looking around some more, it appears it might be called “History Institute of the C.C., WPK” I am going to assume the “C.C.” stands for “Central Committee”.

Central Statistics Bureau (Central Auditing Committee?) – Ot appears they are different functions, but if they use the same building or not isn’t clear. However, with the little information I have, I am going to guess that’s what this building is:

The Central Committee’s current membership population is not known but is estimate at between 130 and 140 members with an unknown number of candidate and alternate members. There are four (4) bodies directly subordinate to the Central Committee: the Political Bureau (Politburo), the Secretariat, the Central Control Committee and the Central Auditing Bureau. Through the Secretariat there are about twenty (20) departments or bureaus tasked with implementing the policies and directives of the KWP (and General- Secretary Kim) The Central Committee is technically supposed to convene at a plenum session every six months, however it meets far less frequently than mandated. Because it meets so infrequently, its policymaking powers (detailed below) are augmented by the Political Bureau, the Secretariat, the Organization and Guidance Department, the Central Military Committee and the National Defense Commission. However, all of these entities can be overridden by Kim Jong-il.

Emphasis mine. Is the Central Auditing Bureau different from the Central Auditing Committee?

KWP Organization Secretariat – This is only listed on WikiMapia, and I am assuming this is the building where the Organization and Guidance Department is. However, it is also said to be in the Administration Department building. I guess more than one building can do different functions for the same department?

Now this is where it really gets interesting. Kim Jong Il’s office. There is some discrepancy on what some of the buildings represent such as the guard post/personal first aid office. Maybe it does both, who knows, but he has a lot of personal stuff there to say the least. As for the office itself:

These are the central executive offices of the DPRK; the official office of KWP/NDC Chairman Kim Jong-il and his senior staff. The office buildings are strategically placed behind the high rises on the east side of Changgwang Street. The official office of Kim Jong il is located on the third floor of the main building. General-Secretary Kim first occupied this building in 1976 after President Kim il Sung decamped for Kumsusan.

And according to this map, there are supposed official homes of Kim Jong Il:

This one of the official homes of NDC Chairman and KWP General Secretary, Kim Jong il. This is the home General Kim established with his first significant consort, the actress Sung Hye-rim and where his eldest son, Kim Jong Nam, grew up with his aunt and cousins. There is a sub-basement level connecting to the neighboring Leadership Offices.

Not only that, but apartments for his personal staff, a little building attached to his main office for scheduling, Office 36 for supply, and what looks like to be several banquet halls. In the description above, there are supposedly a “sub-basement level” connecting the other leadership offices, which would not surprise me, because Nicolae Ceausescu had a series of underground tunnels as well. Furthermore, North Korea is famous for their tunneling, but it does not prove anything, though. If it is true, that would be interesting if it were to be found later (and that will be covered in the Imagining a Post Divided Korea). Another interesting thing is a divided Germany had a “Bunker Government” in the event of disaster (as did/does (?) the United States). The question is, is that what the purpose of this “sub-basement” is exactly is not known to me, but given the paranoid nature of Kim Jong Il, it would not surprise me.

At any rate, I do not know if any tourists are allowed in there (I have not seen or heard any), but it would be interesting to see all the same. If anybody has any extra information, where some of these descriptions come from, I would be very interested.

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Just thought you should know.

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The usual disclaimers apply in this posting. This is part of the series where I start really guessing. I suppose it is because it may get boring hearing the same stuff re-hashed when Pyongyang watchers know the back story as it is. Finally, this is where in a few years I can look back at this and see what an idiot I was for even writing it.

How will Kim Jong Il react if his back is against the wall?

The two Kims

Let us imagine for a moment if things start to fall apart while Kim Jong Il is alive from the top. To make things very clear, there is little evidence to suggest Kim Jong Il’s power is in any real danger. Since his grip on power is so absolute, and the circumstances surrounding his closed kingdom is, it will be very difficult (at best) to see some kind of upheaval from below than from the top. As for outside intervention, I see little incentive or possibility for that anytime in the near future. From what I see, nobody in the major powers is concerned about Kim Jong Il, other than seeing stability there. Sure, it has come very close before say in the 1994 crisis, but because Kim Il Sung only thought about himself. Like his kid, he probably knew the consequences for restarting the Korean War. His regime would be gone.  So he did what any narcissist would do; tell others what they want to hear and bend the rules to fit their agenda and needs, without any regard for others. Also, Kim Jong Il effectively took over everything, and Kim Il Sung was only the figurehead in that transition of power (See Policy Elites). He would die a few months later from a heart attack (which in of itself is a very interesting anecdote). So what role Kim Jong Il had in the wake of the 1994 crisis is unclear, but the Policy Elites paper does discuss the role Kim Jong Il might have taken not only to secure his power, but how to deal with outside intervention. Does this give a clue as to how he will react if things go sour?

Kim Chong-il used the Organizational Guidance Department and a rigorous inspection guidance system to identify and co-opt critical nodes within the party, state, military, and security apparatuses. His network resembled that of the old Soviet network, relying on second echelon apparatchiks to perform surveillance and control functions. Particular focus was placed on the organizational elements within ministries and departments. These parts of the bureaucracy reported directly to Kim Chong-il via the Organizational Guidance Department. Once this foothold had been established within a bureaucracy, tentacles were spread out to other offices through guidance and discipline measures. In addition to this informal apparatus of control, Kim Chong-il took increasingly bold measures to undermine, compromise, and otherwise bend the senior leadership to his will. This included a system of phone tapping and other measures of surveillance, which stretched all the way up and included Kim Il-sung’s personal office.

From this tidbit alone, it appears Kim Jong Il’s reach on controlling even his inner circle is deeply rooted and carefully watched. Since part one of this series suggested, “paranoid orientation, not only in the sense of being psychotic, out of touch with reality, but always on guard, feeling ready to be betrayed, seeing himself surrounded by enemies”. So his ultra-paranoia may make things difficult for anybody in the policy elites or his inner circle to form factions, let alone plot a coup. I am not suggesting it is not impossible, but from this, it makes things very, very difficult.

To make things even more difficult, there are other aspects of Kim’s personality that warrant how he may keep control over the policy elites and his inner circle. One is, “no constraint of conscious. Kim’s only loyalty is to himself and his own survival. He also recognizes the need to sustain his inner circle’s perquisites and indulgent lifestyle, for he requires their support, but he combines this lavish indulgence with humiliation to maintain his control over his leadership circle” Not only does Kim Jong Il want to maintain a lavish lifestyle, but he needs to keep his inner circle and the people he depends on happy (with humiliation) to maintain power. This probably explains the little known-Room 39 apparatus where he keeps his slush fund, and maintains it by exports of drugs, weapons, counterfeit items and the like. I am going to guess if there is no way to keep the elite of the elite happy, he might fear (and may be a legitimate one) losing control and they betraying him. So he not only keeps close tabs on them, making examples out of them by sending them away (to prison camps, re-education, throwing them out of the circle, etc.). That also may explain why some high ranking officials seem to disappear then sometimes re-appear. Jang Song Theak is a possible example. Finally, that slush fund needs to be filled to the brim to keep this scheme going. I do not know if the economic sanctions banning the luxury goods do any good because it is, after all, a black market and I am sure he knows ways around the sanctions. However, the sanctions might make thing more difficult for him, I am not very sure of that.

So let us start with the top elites. Is there a possibility if he loses loyalty of the top elites they could turn against him and form a coup of some kind? Once the goodies run out and there is no way to pay for their loyalty (since he is a jerk), how else will he maintain control over his circle? It could go one of two ways perhaps: Flawed interpersonal relationships. A tendency to see others as the extension of the self, with little capacity to to appreciate the needs of others. Loyalty is accordingly a one-way street. Moreover, individuals who are seen to be powerful in their own right are perceived to be a threat and are eliminated. Or, Saying or promising whatever is useful at the moment, with words that are strictly instrumental, to accomplish what is necessary; apparently sincere agreements are easily changed or disregarded. Could at a moment of desperation trying to hold on to power as things fall apart (say Kim sees his loyal base start to seriously fracture) lead to making promises of glory and goodies keep them loyal, or, will he start eliminating his rivals? I am going to guess the latter may be quicker and cheaper. Problem is, if there is massive discontent from the top, and say in the unlikely event the top is successfully pushing Kim out of power, who or what will replace those being eliminated be replaced with? I am going to assume since he regularly changes guard and watches their every move, such a thing seems very unlikely, but again, not impossible.

If something like this were to happen, and say somebody in the top circle were to push Kim out of power successfully, how would Kim react and what actions will he take if he is pushed out? The thought of that is unthinkable, and am having a very hard time imagining the outcomes, not only for the population, but a careful international community that tries to keep close tabs on the the DPRK. Since Kim Jong Il will do whatever is necessary to remain in power, I cannot see him being pushed out without a huge struggle. However, looking to Hitler’s actions when he knew defeat was well underway, and the Soviets were knocking on the door, he took his own life. He had his loyal subjects around him, and they stayed with him until the bitter end taking the same route as Hitler. In this historical outcome, it may be important to know what kind of personality Hitler had, and in this article in the New York Times:

Like Stalin and Hitler, Mr. Hussein has sometimes been referred to as a madman, in part because people are reluctant to accept such ruthlessness and cruelty as the product of anything but insanity.

But bad does not equal mad. Most historical analysts have rejected the notion that mental illness could explain the actions of either Stalin or Hitler. Experts familiar with Mr. Hussein’s upbringing and years in power said that there was no evidence that he suffered from psychosis or any severe mental illness. The very fact that he was able to stay in charge for so long and exert such complete control argues against insanity, the experts said.

Two researchers, Jerrold M. Post and Amatzia Baram, concluded in a psychological profile of Mr. Hussein that he was more accurately described as a malignant narcissist, a label that has also been applied to Stalin and Hitler. Dr. Post, a psychiatrist at George Washington University, and Dr. Baram, an expert on Iraq at the University of Haifa in Israel, wrote the profile for the United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center. Dr. Post was also the founding director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s political profiling program.

Emphasis mine. If they share similar behavior profiles, maybe it can be helpful to know how their regimes ended. Hitler has already been looked at with the video linked earlier. Just from memory alone, it seems they do share similar traits. While I am (again) not an expert on these people’s lives, it does appear similar:

* Stalin’s rule ended with his death, and nobody challenged his power. He sent many people to the gulags, got rid of his  enemies real or imagined, loved only himself, and required everybody to only love him through a huge cult of personality. His “end” was not the end of the Soviet Union, but de-stalinization. Stalin’s father was an abusive drinker and left him when he was just five years old.

* Saddam got rid of his enemies with ruthlessness, had sons that were just as self-serving as himself, gassed his own people, had a cult of personality, and his regime lasted until coalition forces came in and ended his regime by force. His sons were killed, and he was found in a rat hole. Saddam never knew his real father, but his step father was abusive.

* Ceauşescu was just as paranoid, ran a huge police state like the other dictators, had a huge cult of personality, tried his hand at succession, looked to other regimes to fit his own needs, displaced people, had no regard for others, surrounded himself with “yes-men” (and women too), got rid of his enemies with impunity, lived in the lap of luxury like the other dictators, had tunnels to hide in, even as things were ending, he insisted he was the true leader and could not understand why everybody turned against him. Come to think of it, Saddam insisted the same thing as the rope was around his neck. Ceauşescu’s regime would end with him and his wife’s death. Ceauşescu’s father was also abusive, and he ran off to escape him.

All of these men shared a similar trait, they were all paranoid, and seemed to react in extreme ways when the paranoia got worse. Either they tried to hide, run away, do away with their enemies real or imagined, had bunkers/some isolated place to run to, and that is just from recall. Since I am not all that certain as to how they did things exactly, it does seem rather similar. Can this fit in Kim Jong Il’s reaction if things should get worse for him, assuming he is still alive if things go badly? I will venture a guess Kim Jong Il may do away with his enemies real or imagined as his paranoia gets worse, and if things really turn for the worse may run away and/or hide. After all, the international community (at the least) will want his head on a pike. Could Kim Jong Il live with a de-kimmification if somebody would jockey for power? Could Kim go the way of Hitler and commit suicide? I do not have a crystal ball, but I guess I can bet some money on Kim running away and trying to hide if say the KWP or KPA (or both) should turn against him (if he is successful is another thing). I cannot see him turning the gun on himself, because I think he will always think he is the true leader, and will guess he will trumpet that until the end. After all, [s]capegoating when plans don’t work out. Since narcissists must be seen as perfect, when one of Kim’s plans misfires, the problem is not in the concept but the execution. Thus, Kim is ready to scapegoat when his plans don’t work out. Would Kim Jong Il be so convinced of his own brilliance and ideas that even when the noose dangles around his neck will claim leadership to the bitter end like Saddam or proclaim “not fair” when marched down to the firing squad like Nicolae? I do not know.

Anyway, after all of this, it is my opinion I do not think the inner circle or the top elites will turn the guns against Kim Jong Il. I think if some other regime should try to jockey for power, it will be some other faction away from the inner circle at least. Is there any evidence of factions? None that I see because of the way the Kims constructed the regime, and how the regime is supposedly run. With security and paranoia at the top of the list, again, such a thing would be very difficult. I am simply guessing if at the unlikely event that should happen. Finally, it goes along with if Kim should be removed from power by his own inner circle, I do not know if the new regime will be any better than Kim’s. Regime change is not always for the better. A recent article that cropped up since I started this thing was found on AFP:

North Korea’s dictatorial regime is unlikely to fall anytime soon, a defector who once worked for leader Kim Jong Il and his father Kim Il Sung, said here Thursday.

“It’s unthinkable,” said Kim Jong Ryul, a former colonel on Kim Jong Il’s personal security detail, told AFP.

On a side note, I would like to get this book, but it is only in German. Perhaps Saku could translate. I can understand the sad tone, because after all, many thought the regime would go away after Kim Il Sung died. Going back to the hazards model Marcus Noland wrote about was, regime change was probably at its peak at that space in time. Alas, the regime was successful in the handover even though there was a famine, the nuclear program crisis, and the the like.

Another possibility if Kim Jong Il were pushed aside is the question of reforms and the willingness to negotiate in the “cooperative engagement” scenario. Yes, I understand in Korea After Kim Jong Il assumed Kim would die in his sleep and one of his sons would take over, but could that include another regime residual from the old regime appratus? Maybe not because, that scenario was discussing chances of regime change, which reduced to less than 1 percent. In this question, regime change happens, so it does not apply here. I am pretty sure if another regime should take over, there would be all kinds of very, very serious problems within the country and the major powers will be scrambling to assess the situation. Of course they will rush to the new regime and see what they are willing and not willing to do. Just the thought of that makes my head swim.

That goes into the very first thing in crisis management: Stability.

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